A logic for reasoning about the probability of fuzzy events

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Abstract

In this paper we present the logic $FP(L_n, L)$ which allows to reason about the probability of fuzzy events formalized by means of the notion of state in a MV-algebra. This logic is defined starting from a basic idea exposed by Hájek in [13]. Two kinds of semantics have been introduced, namely the class of weak and strong probabilistic models. The main result of this paper is a completeness theorem for the logic $FP(L_n, L)$ w.r.t. both weak and strong models. We also present two extensions of $FP(L_n, L)$: the first one is the logic $FP(L_n, RPL)$, obtained by expanding the $FP(L_n, L)$-language with truth constants for the rationals in $[0,1]$, while the second extension is the logic $FCP(L_n, L\Pi_1^2)$ allowing to reason about conditional states.

\textit{Key words:} Lukasiewicz logic, state and conditional states on MV-algebras, fuzzy events, standard completeness.

\textit{PACS:}

A fuzzy-logical treatment for the probability of classical (crisp) events has been widely studied in the last years. In particular, starting from the basic ideas exposed by Hájek, Godo and Esteva in [14] and then later refined by Hájek in [13], simple (i.e. unconditional) and conditional probability can be studied by using various kind of modal-fuzzy logics (see [6,8–10,18]). The very basic idea allowing a treatment of simple probability inside a fuzzy-logical setting consists of interpreting the probability of an (classical) proposition $\varphi$ as the truth value of a modal proposition $P(\varphi)$ which reads $\varphi$ is probable.

Taking Łukasiewicz logic $L$ as base logic, this is done by first enlarging the language of $L$ by means of a unary (fuzzy) modality $P$ for probably, and defining

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two kinds of formulas: classical Boolean formulas \( \varphi, \psi, \ldots \) (which are definable in \( L \)) and modal formulas: for each Boolean formula \( \varphi \), \( P(\varphi) \) is an atomic modal formula and, moreover, such a class of modal formulas, \( MF \), is taken closed under the connectives of Lukasiewicz logic. And then by defining a set of axioms and an inference rule reflecting those of a probability measure, namely:

\[
(P1) \quad P(\neg \varphi \lor \psi) \rightarrow (P(\varphi) \rightarrow P(\psi)), \\
(P2) \quad P(\neg \varphi) \equiv \neg P(\varphi), \\
(P3) \quad P(\varphi \lor \psi) \equiv ((P(\varphi) \rightarrow P(\varphi \land \psi)) \rightarrow P(\psi)),
\]

and the necessity Rule: \( \frac{\varphi}{P(\varphi)} \) for any Boolean formula \( \varphi \).

The resulting logic, \( FP(L) \), is sound and (finite) strong complete [13] with respect to the intended probabilistic semantics given by the class of probabilistic Kripke models. These are structures \( \mathcal{M} = (W, \mu, e) \) where \( W \) is a non-empty set, \( e : W \times BF \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \) (where \( BF \) denotes the set of Boolean formulas) is such that, for all \( w \in W \), \( e(w, \cdot) \) is a Boolean evaluation of non-modal formulas, and \( \mu \) is a finitely additive probability measure on a Boolean subalgebra \( \Omega \subseteq 2^W \) such that, for every Boolean formula \( \varphi \), the set \( \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_W = \{w \in W : e(w, \varphi) = 1\} \) is \( \mu \)-measurable, i.e. \( \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_W \in \Omega \) and hence \( \mu(\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_W) \) is defined. Then, the truth-evaluation of a formula \( P\varphi \) in a model \( \mathcal{M} \) is given by \( \| P(\varphi) \|_{\mathcal{M}} = \mu(\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_W) \) and it is extended to compound (modal) formulas using Lukasiewicz logic connectives. The completeness result for \( FP(L) \) states that a (modal) formula \( \Phi \) follows from a finite set of (modal) formulas \( \Gamma \) (using the axioms and rules of \( FP(L) \)) iff \( \| \Phi \|_{\mathcal{M}} = 1 \) in any probabilistic Kripke model \( \mathcal{M} \) that evaluates all formulas in \( \Gamma \) with value 1. The same results holds \( FP(RPL) \), that is, if instead of \( L \) we use as base logic \( RPL \), the expansion of \( L \) with rational truth-constants. Thus both \( FP(L) \) and \( FP(RPL) \) are adequate for a treatment of simple probability.

An extension of the notion of probability to the framework of fuzzy sets was early defined by Zadeh in order to represent and reasoning about sentences like the probability that the traffic in Rome will be chaotic tomorrow is 0.7. Clearly, the modeling of this kind of knowledge cannot be done using the classical approach to probability since, given the un-sharp nature of events like chaotic traffic, the structure of such fuzzy events cannot be considered to be a Boolean algebra any longer. The study of finitely-additive measures in the context of MV-algebras, structures more general than Boolean algebras, was started by Mundici in [20] and further developed by Mundici and Riečan in [21], as well as by Kroupa [17].

Therefore, a fuzzy logical approach to reason about the probability of fuzzy
events is, in our opinion, a natural generalization of the previous works which can bring an important improvement to their expressive power and, moreover, it can be also useful from the point of view of applications. In logical terms, this can be approached by assuming that the logic of events is a (suitable) many-valued logic and by defining and axiomatizing appropriate probability-like measures on top of the many-valued propositions.

In [13] Hájek already proposed a logic built up over the Łukasiewicz predicate calculus $\mathcal{L}V$ allowing a treatment of (simple) probability of fuzzy events. To model this kind of probability, Hájek introduced in $\mathcal{L}V$ a generalized fuzzy quantifier standing for \textit{most} together with a set of characteristic axioms and denoted his logic by $\mathcal{L}V f$. In his monograph Hájek also proposed two (Kripke-style) probabilistic semantics for this logic, called \textit{weak} and \textit{strong}. A variant of these two kinds of models will be introduced in details later on, but roughly speaking they can be described as follows:

- A weak probabilistic model for $\mathcal{L}V f$ evaluates a modal formula $P(\varphi)$ by means of a finitely additive measure (or \textit{state}) defined over the MV-algebra of provably equivalent Łukasiewicz formulas (see [16,21] for a detailed definition of state over an MV-algebra).
- A strong probabilistic model for $\mathcal{L}V f$ consists of a probability distribution $\sigma$ over the set of all the evaluations of the events (remember that an event is now a formula of the Łukasiewicz calculus). Then the truth value of a modal formula $P(\varphi)$ is defined as the \textit{integral} of the fuzzy-set of all the evaluations of $\varphi$ under the measure $\sigma$.

Hájek shows this logic is Pavelka-style complete w.r.t. weak probabilistic models, but the issue of completeness w.r.t. to the strong semantics still remains as an open problem.

In this paper, instead of considering a predicate calculus, we want to remain at a propositional level and investigate probabilistic completeness in the usual sense by using the same approach as in the above $FP(L)$ logic, but considering fuzzy events instead of Boolean events. In particular we will use the finite-valued Łukasiewicz logics $L_n$ (for any $n > 2$) in order to treat fuzzy events and we will consider for them weak and strong models adapted to our case. We will use $FP(L_n, L)$ to denote such a logic. This notation, although it differs from Hájek’s original notation, allows us to point out both, the logic of events (the first argument) and the logic which is used in order to reason about modal formulas $P(\varphi)$ (the second argument).

The reasons why we have decided to start with modelling fuzzy events as formulas of a finitely-valued Łukasiewicz logic $L_n$ and not of the infinitely-valued Łukasiewicz logic (such a logic would be denoted by $FP(L, L)$) are essentially the following:
(a) Finitely-valued Lukasiewicz logics $L_n$ are natural generalizations of classical
Boolean logic and extensions of the infinitely-valued Lukasiewicz logic $L$, with
good logical and algebraic properties, hence a good compromise.

(b) Studying $FP(L_n, L)$ could make the study of $FP(L, L)$ easier which, indeed,
seems quite problematic. The idea is, in fact, to treat the logic $FP(L, L)$ as
a limit case of $FP(L_n, L)$ when $n$ tends to infinity. Just remember that this
is what happens in $L$: a formula is a theorem of $L$ iff it is a theorem of $L_n$
for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$ (see [2] for more details).

In this paper we will prove that, for each $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $FP(L_n, L)$ is (finite) strong
complete w.r.t. the both classes of weak and strong models.

This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall some known logical
and algebraic notions and results which will be used throughout this paper.
In Section 3 we define the logic $FP(L_n, L)$ and we also introduce the classes
of weak and strong probabilistic models, while in Section 4 we prove that
$FP(L_n, L)$ is complete (in the usual sense) w.r.t. these both classes of models.
In Section 5 we present two extensions of $FP(L_n, L)$: the logic $FP(L_n, RPL)$
obtained by expanding the $FP(L_n, L)$-language with rational truth-constants,
and the logic $FCP(L_n, LII_{2})$ allowing to reason about conditional probabilities
(states). Finally, Section 6 contains some concluding remarks and the outline
of our future work.

1 Preliminaries

1.1 Łukasiewicz logics

In this first part we introduce some (well) known notions about finitely-valued
and infinitely-valued Łukasiewicz logics which will be used throughout the rest
of this paper.

For both logics we will consider a language consisting of a countable set of
propositional variables $V = \{p_1, p_2, \ldots\}$, two binary connectives $\&$ and $\rightarrow$
and the truth-constant $\top$. Further connectives are defined as follows:

$\neg \varphi$ stands for $\varphi \rightarrow \top$,
$\varphi \oplus \psi$ stands for $\neg(\neg \varphi \& \neg \psi)$,
$\varphi \equiv \psi$ stands for $(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \& (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)$,
$\varphi \land \psi$ stands for $\varphi \& (\varphi \rightarrow \psi)$,
$\varphi \lor \psi$ stands for $(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \land ((\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow \varphi)$.

The set of formulas built from with this language will be denoted $Fm(V)$. 
Definition 1.1 (cf. [2,12,13]) The infinitely-valued Lukasiewicz logic $L$ is defined by the following axioms:

\begin{enumerate}
\item[(L1)] \( \varphi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \),
\item[(L2)] \( (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow ((\psi \rightarrow \chi) \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \chi)) \),
\item[(L3)] \( ((\varphi \rightarrow \overline{\varphi}) \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \overline{\psi})) \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \),
\item[(L4)] \( ((\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow ((\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow \varphi) \).
\end{enumerate}

and the only deduction rule is modus ponens: from \( \varphi \) and \( \varphi \rightarrow \psi \) deduce \( \psi \).

For each \( n \in \mathbb{N} \), the \( n+1 \)-valued Lukasiewicz logic \( L_n \) is the schematic extension of \( L \) with the following two axiom schemata:

\begin{enumerate}
\item[(L5)] \( (n-1)\varphi \equiv n\varphi \),
\item[(L6)] \( (k\varphi^{k-1})^n \equiv n\varphi^k \) for each integer \( k = 2, \ldots, n-2 \) that does not divide \( n-1 \)
\end{enumerate}

where \( n\varphi \) is an abbreviation for \( \varphi \oplus \ldots \oplus \varphi \) (\( n \)-times) and \( \varphi^k \) is an abbreviation for \( \varphi \& \ldots \& \varphi \) (\( k \)-times).

The notions of theorem and proof are defined as usual. As for notation, given a theory (i.e. a set of formulas) \( \Gamma \) and a formula \( \varphi \), we will write \( \Gamma \vdash_L \varphi \) (resp. \( \Gamma \vdash_{L_n} \varphi \)) to say that \( \varphi \) is derivable from \( \Gamma \) in \( L \) (resp. in \( L_n \)).

The algebraic counterpart for the logic \( L \) is the variety of MV-algebras while the algebraic counterpart for the logics \( L_n \) are the MV-subvarieties \( \text{MV}_n \) defined next, where we use the same notation for the algebraic operation as for the corresponding logical connectives. We note that MV-algebras are traditionally defined taking \( \oplus \) and \( \neg \) as primitive operations instead of \( \& \) and \( \rightarrow \). In that case the corresponding algebras are called Wajsberg-algebras, and they are definitionally equivalent to MV-algebras.

Definition 1.2 An MV-algebra is an algebra \( A = \langle A, \oplus, \neg, 0 \rangle \) of type \( (2,1,0) \) such that \( (A, \oplus, 0) \) is a commutative monoid satisfying the following equations:

\begin{align*}
  x \oplus \neg 0 &= \neg 0, \\
  \neg \neg x &= x, \\
  \neg(\neg x \oplus y) \oplus y &= \neg(\neg y \oplus x) \oplus x.
\end{align*}

An MV\(_n\) algebra is an MV-algebra further satisfying the equations:

\begin{align*}
  nx &= (n-1)x, \\
  (kx^{k-1})^n &= nx^k, \text{ for every natural } k = 2, \ldots, n-2 \text{ not dividing } n-1,
\end{align*}

where again \( nx \) is an abbreviation for \( x \oplus \ldots \oplus x \) (\( n \)-times) and \( x^k \) is an abbreviation for \( x \& \ldots \& x \) (\( k \)-times), with \( x \& y \) standing for \( \neg(\neg x \oplus \neg y) \).

If \( \sim_L \) and \( \sim_{L_n} \) denote the relations of provable equivalence over \( L \) and \( L_n \),
respectively, the Lindenbaum algebras $\text{Lm}(\mathcal{L})/\sim_\mathcal{L}$ and $\text{Lm}(\mathcal{L})/\sim_{\mathcal{L}_n}$ are examples of (non linearly-ordered) MV and MV$_n$ algebras respectively.

A prototypical example of a linearly-ordered MV-algebra is the algebra over the real unit interval, so-called standard, $[0,1]_{MV} = ([0,1], \oplus, \neg, 0)$, where for each $x, y \in [0,1]$, $x \oplus y = \min\{1, x+y\}$ and $\neg x = 1-x$. Replacing the real unit interval $[0,1]$ by the set $S_n = \{0, \frac{1}{n}, \ldots, \frac{n-1}{n}, 1\}$, and defining the operations $\oplus$ and $\neg$ as the restriction of those of $[0,1]_{MV}$ to $\{0, \frac{1}{n}, \ldots, \frac{n-1}{n}, 1\}$, the obtained structure is the standard MV$_n$-algebra $S_n$.

An evaluation of formulas into $[0,1]_{MV}$ (or $[0,1]_{MV}$-evaluation) is a map $e$ from the set $V$ of propositional variables into $[0,1]$ which is extended to all formulas by induction as follows: $e(0) = 0$, $e(\varphi \oplus \psi) = \max(1, e(\varphi) + e(\psi))$ and $e(\neg \varphi) = 1 - e(\varphi)$. A formula $\varphi$ is a tautology over $[0,1]_{MV}$ if $e(\varphi) = 1$ for any $[0,1]_{MV}$-evaluation $e$. Moreover $\varphi$ is a logical consequence of a set of formulas $\Gamma$ over $[0,1]_{MV}$, written $\Gamma \models_{[0,1]_{MV}} \varphi$, if $e(\varphi) = 1$ for every $[0,1]_{MV}$-evaluation $e$ such that $e(\psi) = 1$ for all $\psi \in \Gamma$. The notions of $S_n$-evaluation, and tautology and logical consequence over $S_n$ are defined analogously.

Infinitely-valued Łukasiewicz logic $L$ is known to be finite strongly complete w.r.t. the standard MV-algebra $[0,1]_{MV}$ (cf [13]). This means that, given a finite theory $\Gamma$ and a formula $\varphi$, $\Gamma \vdash_{L} \varphi$ iff $\Gamma \models_{[0,1]_{MV}} \varphi$. On the other hand, $(n + 1)$-valued Łukasiewicz logic $L_n$ is known to be strong complete, i.e. it holds that $\Gamma \vdash_{L_n} \varphi$ iff $\Gamma \models_{S_n} \varphi$ for arbitrary theories $\Gamma$ (cf. [2]).

**Remark 1.3** Notice that strong completeness for $L$ does not hold, there are infinite theories $\Gamma$ and formulas $\varphi$ such that $\varphi$ is a logical consequence of $\Gamma$ but $\Gamma \not\vdash_{L} \varphi$. A nice example is available in [13].

### 1.2 Probability on MV-algebras

The classical notion of (finitely additive) probability measure on Boolean algebras was generalized in [20] by the notion of state on MV-algebras.

**Definition 1.4 ([20])** By a state of an MV-algebra $\mathcal{A} = \langle A, \oplus, \neg, 0 \rangle$ we mean a function $s : A \to [0,1]$ satisfying:

1. $s(0) = 0$,
2. $s(\neg x) = 1 - s(x)$,
3. if $x \& y = 0$, then $s(x \oplus y) = s(x) + s(y)$.

In [20] it is shown that a state $s$ on an MV-algebra $\mathcal{A}$ further satisfies the two following properties for all $x, y \in A$:
(iv) \( s(x \oplus y) = s(x) + s(y) - s(x \& y) \),
(v) if \( x \leq y \) then \( s(x) \leq s(y) \).

Interesting examples of MV-algebras are the so-called Lukasiewicz clans of functions. Given a non-empty set \( X \), consider the set of functions \( [0,1]^X \). A (Lukasiewicz) clan over \( X \) is a subset \( C \subseteq [0,1]^X \) such that

1. if \( f, g \in C \) then \( f \oplus g \in C \)
2. if \( f \in C \) then \( \neg f \in C \)

where the operations \( \oplus \) and \( \neg \) are the point-wise extensions of the operations in the standard MV-algebra \( [0,1]_{MV} \). A clan \( \mathcal{T} \) over \( X \) is called a (Lukasiewicz) tribe when it is closed with respect to a countable (pointwise) application of the \( \oplus \) operation, i.e. if the following condition holds. In particular \([0,1]^X\) and \((S_n)^X\) with the above operations are examples of Lukasiewicz tribes.

In [23], Zadeh introduced the following notion of probability on fuzzy sets. A fuzzy subset of \( X \) can be considered just as a function \( \mu \in [0,1]^X \). Then, given a probability measure \( p : 2^X \to [0,1] \) on \( X \), the probability of \( \mu \) is defined as

\[
p^*(\mu) = \sum_{x \in X} \mu(x) \cdot p(x)
\]

where we have written \( p(x) \) for \( p(\{x\}) \). Indeed, \( p^* \) is an example of state over the tribe \([0,1]^X\). The restriction of \( p^* \) over the \( S_n \)-valued fuzzy sets is also an example of state over \((S_n)^X\).

2 The logic \( FP(L_n,L) \) and its semantics

In this section we will define the modal-fuzzy logic \( FP(L_n,L) \). Moreover the classes of weak and strong probabilistic Kripke models will be introduced.

**Definition 2.1** The language of the logic \( FP(L_n,L) \) is built over a countable set of propositional variables \( V = \{p_1, p_2, \ldots \} \), the truth-constant \( \top \), the connectives of Lukasiewicz logic, namely \( \&, \rightarrow \), and a symbol \( P \) for the modality probably. Formulas of \( FP(L_n,L) \) split into two classes:

- The set \( \text{Fm}(V) \) of non-modal formulas: these will be formulas of \( L_n \). Non-modal formulas will be denoted by lower case Greek letters \( \varphi, \psi \ldots \)
- The set \( \text{MFm}(V) \) of modal formulas, built from atomic modal formulas \( P(\varphi) \), with \( \varphi \in \text{Fm}(V) \), using connectives \( \&, \rightarrow \) and the truth-constant \( \top \).
We shall denote them by upper case Greek letters $\Phi, \Psi \ldots$

Axioms and rules of $FP(L_n, L)$ are as follows:

- Axioms of $L$ for modal and non-modal formulas.
- Axioms (L5) and (L6) restricted to non-modal formulas.
- The following axiom schemata for the modality $P$:
  \begin{align*}
  \text{(FP1)} & \quad P(\neg \varphi) \equiv \neg P(\varphi), \\
  \text{(FP2)} & \quad P(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (P(\varphi) \rightarrow P(\psi)), \\
  \text{(FP3)} & \quad P(\varphi \oplus \psi) \equiv [(P(\varphi) \rightarrow P(\varphi \& \psi)) \rightarrow P(\psi)].
  \end{align*}
- The rule of modus ponens (for modal and non-modal formulas)

  \[ \text{the rule of necessitation: from } \varphi \text{ derive } P\varphi \]

The notion of proof in $FP(L_n, L)$, denoted $\vdash_{FP}$, is defined as usual. For instance, given a modal theory $\Gamma$ we will write $\Gamma \vdash_{FP} \Phi$ to denote that $\Phi$ is provable from $\Gamma$ in $FP(L_n, L)$.

As anticipated in the introduction, for $FP(L_n, L)$ we consider two kinds of probabilistic Kripke models. The first kind of models is the class of weak probabilistic Kripke models which are defined as follows:

**Definition 2.2** A weak probabilistic Kripke model (or weak model) for $FP(L_n, L)$ is a system $\mathcal{M} = (W, e, I)$ where:

- $W$ is a non-empty set whose elements are called nodes,
- $e : W \times V \rightarrow \{0, 1/n, \ldots, (n-1)/n, 1\}$ is such that, for each $w \in W$, $e(w, \cdot) : V \rightarrow \{0, 1/n, \ldots, (n-1)/n, 1\}$ is an evaluation of propositional variables which extends to a $S_n$-evaluation of (non-modal) formulas of $Fm(V)$ in the usual way.
- For each $\varphi \in Fm(V)$, define the course of values of $\varphi$ as the function $\varphi^\#_W : W \rightarrow [0, 1]$ by putting $\varphi^\#_W(w) = e(w, \varphi)$. The set of courses of values $Fm^\#_W = \{\varphi^\#_W \mid \varphi \in Fm(V)\}$ is a clan over $W$.
- $I$ is a state over the clan $Fm^\#_W$, i.e. $I : Fm^\#_W \rightarrow [0, 1]$ satisfies:
  \begin{enumerate}
  \item $I(\top^\#_W) = 1$,
  \item $I(\neg \varphi^\#_W) = 1 - I(\varphi^\#_W)$,
  \item $I(\varphi^\#_W \oplus \psi^\#_W) = I(\varphi^\#_W) + I(\psi^\#_W) - I(\varphi^\#_W \& \psi^\#_W)$.
  \end{enumerate}

where $\neg, \oplus$ and $\&$ here are taken as the point-wise extensions of the Lukasiewicz operations in $[0, 1]_{M_V}$.

Given a weak probabilistic Kripke model $\mathcal{M}$ for $FP(L_n, L)$, a formula $\Phi$ and a $w \in W$, the truth value of $\Phi$ in $\mathcal{M}$ at the node $w$ ($\|\Phi\|_{\mathcal{M}, w}$) is inductively defined as follows:

- If $\Phi$ is a non-modal formula $\varphi$, then $\|\varphi\|_{\mathcal{M}, w} = e(w, \varphi)$,
- If $\Phi$ is an atomic modal formula $P(\psi)$, then $\|P(\psi)\|_{\mathcal{M}, w} = I(\psi^\#_W)$,
- If $\Phi$ is a non-atomic modal formula, then its truth value is computed by evalu-
uating its atomic modal sub-formulas, and then by using the truth functions
associated to the L-connectives occurring in $\Phi$.

Note that if $\Phi$ is a modal formula, then its truth value in a weak probabilistic
Kripke model is independent from $w$, thus we will omit the subscript $w$. The
notions of model and validity of a formula in a theory are defined as usual.

The second kind of models for $FP(\mathcal{L}_n, \mathcal{L})$ is the class of strong probabilistic
Kripke models which are defined as follows.

**Definition 2.3** A strong probabilistic Kripke model (or strong model) for
$FP(\mathcal{L}_n, \mathcal{L})$ is a system $\mathcal{N} = \langle W, e, \sigma \rangle$ where $W$ and $e$ are defined as in the
case of a weak probabilistic Kripke model (Definition 2.2) and $\sigma$ is a probabil-
ity distribution on $W$, i.e. $\sigma : W \rightarrow [0, 1]$ satisfies

$$\sum_{w \in W} \sigma(w) = 1.$$

Evaluations of formulas of $FP(\mathcal{L}_n, \mathcal{L})$ in a strong probabilistic Kripke model
$\mathcal{N}$ are defined as in the case of weak model except for the case of atomic modal
formulas:

- If $\Phi$ is an atomic modal formula $P(\psi)$, then

$$\|P(\psi)\|_\mathcal{N} = \sum_{w \in W} e(w, \psi) \cdot \sigma(w).$$

Notice that the name strong is indeed justified by the fact that each strong
probabilistic model $\mathcal{M} = \langle W, e, \sigma \rangle$ induces a weak probabilistic model $\mathcal{M}' =
\langle W, e, I_\sigma \rangle$, where $I_\sigma : FM_W \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is defined as

$$I_\sigma(\varphi \#) = \sum_{w \in W} e(w, \varphi) \cdot \sigma(w),$$

which is equivalent in the sense that $\|\Phi\|_\mathcal{M} = \|\Phi\|_{\mathcal{M}'}$ for any modal $\Phi$.

It is easy to show that $FP(\mathcal{L}_n, \mathcal{L})$ is sound with respect to the classes of both
weak and strong probabilistic models.

### 3 Weak and strong probabilistic completeness for $FP(\mathcal{L}_n, \mathcal{L})$

This section will be devoted to the proof of the main theorems of this paper.
Namely we are going to prove $FP(\mathcal{L}_n, \mathcal{L})$ is complete w.r.t. the classes of both
weak and strong probabilistic models.
To do this we will follow the technique used in [13]: for each modal formula \( \Theta \), let \( \Theta^* \) be obtained from \( \Theta \) by replacing every occurrence of an atomic sub-formula of the form \( P(\varphi) \) by a new propositional variable \( p_\varphi \). We write \( (P(\varphi))^* = p_\varphi \) and, for each modal formulas \( \Theta \) and \( \Lambda \), we inductively define
\[
(\Theta \circ \Lambda)^* = \Theta^* \circ \Lambda^* \quad \text{(with } o \in \{&, \rightarrow\})
\]
and \( \emptyset^* = \emptyset \).

Let now \( \Gamma \) be a modal theory of \( FP(L_n, L) \). Analogously we can define \( \Gamma^* \) and \( FP^* \) as
\[
\Gamma^* = \{ \Psi^* \mid \Psi \in \Gamma \}
\]
and
\[
FP^* = \{ \Upsilon^* \mid \Upsilon \text{ is an instance of } (FPi), \ i = 1, 2, 3 \} \cup \{ p_\varphi \mid L_n \vdash \varphi \}
\]
respectively.

Using the same technique used in [13] it is not difficult to prove that, if \( \Phi \) is any modal formula of \( FP(L_n, L) \)
\[
\Gamma \not\vdash_{FP} \Phi \iff \Gamma^* \cup FP^* \not\vdash_L \Phi^*.
\]
(1)

Since the set \( V^0 \subset V \) of propositional variables appearing in \( \Gamma \cup \{ \Phi \} \) is finite, without loss of generality we can assume to work with a finitely generated (over \( V^0 \)) non-modal language \( FM(V^0) \).

Notice then that the Lindenbaum algebra
\[
FM(V^0)/\sim_n,
\]
where \( \sim_n \) denotes the relation of provable equivalence in \( L_n \), is finite (see [2] for more details). This means that there are only finitely many different classes
\[
[\varphi]_{\sim_n} = \{ \psi \in FM(V^0) \mid L_n \vdash \varphi \equiv \psi \}.
\]

For each \( [\varphi]_{\sim_n} \) we can choose a representative of the class, we will denote it by \( \varphi^{\square} \). Again notice that there are only finitely many \( \varphi^{\square} \)'s. Let us now adopt the following further translation:

- For each modal formula \( \Phi \), let \( \Phi^{\square} \) be the formula resulting from the substitution of each propositional variable \( p_\varphi \) occurring in \( \Phi^* \) by \( p_{\varphi^{\square}} \).
- If \( \Phi = \Theta \circ \Lambda \) then \( \Phi^{\square} = \Theta^{\square} \circ \Lambda^{\square} \) (with \( o \in \{&, \rightarrow\} \)) and \( \emptyset^{\square} = \emptyset \).

In accordance with such translation, we define \( \Gamma^{\square} \) and \( FP^{\square} \) as:
\[
\Gamma^{\square} = \{ \Psi^{\square} \mid \Psi^* \in \Gamma^* \}
\]
and
\[ FP^\square = \{ \Upsilon^\square \mid \Upsilon \text{ is an instance of } (FP_i), \ i = 1, 2\} \cup \{ p_{\varphi} \mid L_n \vdash \varphi \}. \]

Now we can prove the following:

**Lemma 3.1** \( \Gamma^* \cup FP^* \vdash_L \Phi^* \) \iff \( \Gamma^\square \cup FP^\square \vdash_L \Phi^\square \).

**Proof.** \((\Leftarrow\Rightarrow)\) Let \( \Gamma^\square \cup FP^\square \vdash_L \Phi^\square \). Then, in order to get the claim we have to show that \( \Gamma^* \cup FP^* \vdash_L \Phi^* \) for each \( \Phi \) such that its “boxed” translation is \( \Phi^\square \). For instance, if \( \Phi = P\psi \) then \( \Phi^\square = p_{\psi} = p_{\gamma} \) for each \( \gamma \in [\psi]_n \), therefore, if \( \Gamma^\square \cup FP^\square \vdash_L p_{\gamma} \) we have to show that \( \Gamma^* \cup FP^* \vdash_L p_{\gamma} \) for each \( \gamma \in [\psi]_n \).

First of all let us prove the following:

**Claim A:** Let \( \varphi, \psi \) be \( L_n \)-formulas. Then, if \( L_n \vdash \varphi \equiv \psi \), then \( FP(L_n, L) \vdash P(\varphi) \equiv P(\psi) \) (and in particular \( FP^* \vdash_L p_\varphi \equiv p_\psi \)).

**Proof of Claim A:** \( L_n \vdash \varphi \equiv \psi \) means that \( L_n \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \land (\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \) and thus \( L_n \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \land (\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \). In particular we have that \( L_n \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi \) and \( L_n \vdash \psi \rightarrow \varphi \). If \( L_n \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi \), then \( FP(L_n, L) \vdash P(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \) and therefore (it follows from the monotonic property of \( P \)) \( FP(L_n, L) \vdash P(\varphi) \rightarrow P(\psi) \). Analogously we can show that, if \( L_n \vdash \psi \rightarrow \varphi \), then \( FP(L_n, L) \vdash P(\psi) \rightarrow P(\varphi) \). Therefore \( FP(L_n, L) \vdash P(\varphi) \rightarrow P(\psi) \) and \( FP(L_n, L) \vdash P(\psi) \rightarrow P(\varphi) \) and thus \( FP(L_n, L) \vdash P(\varphi) \equiv P(\psi) \). \( \square \)

Let us now turn back to the proof of Lemma 3.1. Let \( \Phi \) be a modal formula of \( FP(L_n, L) \) and let \( P(\varphi_1), \ldots, P(\varphi_k) \) be all the atomic modal formulas occurring in \( \Phi \). If \( \Gamma^\square \cup FP^\square \vdash_L \Phi^\square \), then, it easily follows from the above claim that \( \Gamma^* \cup FP^* \vdash_L \Phi^* \) where \( \Phi^* \) is any \( L \)-formula obtained by replacing each occurrence of a propositional variable \( p_{\varphi} \), with another one \( p_{\psi} \), such that \( \psi \in [\varphi]_n \). In fact, if \( \psi \in [\varphi]_n \), then \( L_n \vdash \psi \equiv \varphi_i \) and therefore, from the above claim, \( FP^* \vdash_L p_{\psi} \equiv p_{\varphi_i} \). Thus \( p_{\varphi_i} \) can be substituted with \( p_{\psi} \) without loss of generality in the proof. Thus, in particular \( \Gamma^* \cup FP^* \vdash_L \Phi^* \) and this direction is complete.

\((\Rightarrow)\) In order to prove the other direction let us assume \( \Gamma^* \cup FP^* \vdash_L \Phi^* \) and let \( \Psi_1, \ldots, \Psi_k \) be an \( L \)-proof of \( \Phi^* \) in \( \Gamma^* \cup FP^* \). For each \( 1 \leq j \leq k \) replace \( \Psi_j^* \) with \( \Psi_j^\square \), the representative of its equivalence class modulo \( \sim_n \). Clearly \( \Psi_1^\square, \ldots, \Psi_k^\square \) is an \( L \)-proof of (a formula logically equivalent to) \( \Phi^\square \). In fact, if \( \Psi_k^* = \Phi^* \), then \( \Psi_k^\square \equiv \Phi^\square \). Moreover, for each \( 1 \leq i < k \) one of the following holds:

(i) \( \Psi^\square_i \) is (logically equivalent to) an axiom of \( L \),
(ii) $\Psi^t \in \Gamma^0 \cup FP^0$,

(iii) If $\Psi^t$ is obtained by modus ponens from $\Psi^s \rightarrow \Psi^t$ and $\Psi^s$, then we claim that $\Psi^t$ is obtained by modus ponens from $\Psi^s \rightarrow \Psi^t^0$ and $\Psi^s^0$. In fact we have just to note that $(\Psi^s \rightarrow \Psi^t)^0 = \Psi^s \rightarrow \Psi^t^0$ and thus the claim easily follows.

Moreover, since modus ponens is the only inference rule of $L$ we have nothing to add. This conclude the proof of Lemma 3.1. □

**Theorem 3.2** The logic $FP(L_n, L)$ is sound and (finite) strongly complete with respect to the class of weak probabilistic Kripke models.

**Proof.** As usual soundness is easy. In order to prove the completeness, let us assume that $\Gamma \cup \{ \Phi \}$ be a finite modal theory of $FP(L_n, L)$ such that $\Gamma \models_{FP} \Phi$.

By using (1) and Lemma 3.1 we have the following:

$$\Gamma \models_{FP} \Phi \text{ iff } \Gamma^0 \cup FP^0 \models_L \Phi^0.$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

The task is now to find a weak probabilistic Kripke model $M$ of $\Gamma$ such that $\|\Phi\|_M < 1$. Notice that now $\Gamma^0 \cup FP^0$ is a finite $L$-theory, therefore (2) and the finite strong standard completeness of Łukasiewicz logic ensure that, if $\Gamma \models_{FP} \Phi$, then there exists an $L$-evaluation $v$ which is a model for $\Gamma^0 \cup FP^0$, and such that $v(\Phi^0) < 1$.

Let now $M$ be the system $M = \langle \Omega_n, e, I \rangle$, where $\Omega_n$ is a shorthand for $\Omega_{L_n}$, the class of all the $L_n$-evaluations over the formulas $Fm(V)$, $e : \Omega_n \times V \rightarrow \{0, 1/n, \ldots, n - 1/n, 1\}$ is defined as $e(w, q) = w(q)$ if $q \in V^0$ and $e(w, q) = 0$ otherwise, and $I : Fm\Omega_n \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is defined as $\mu(\varphi^\#_{I_n}) = v(p_{\varphi^\#})$. For the sake of a lighter notation, we will write $\varphi^\#$ instead of $\varphi^\#_{I_n}$. In order to prove that $M$ is a weak probabilistic Kripke model for $FP(L_n, L)$ we have just to show that the following properties for $I$ hold:

(1) If $L_n \vdash \varphi \equiv \psi$, then $I(\varphi^\#) = I(\psi^\#)$: if $L_n \vdash \varphi \equiv \psi$, then $\varphi^\# = \psi^\#$ and thus the claim follows.

(2) If $L_n \vdash \varphi$, then $I(\varphi^\#) = 1$: if $L_n \vdash \varphi$, then $\varphi \in \ul{\Gamma}$ and thus the claim follows by the above property (1).

(3) $I(\neg \varphi^\#) = 1 - I(\varphi^\#)$. This instance of axiom $FP1$, $p(\neg \varphi^\#) \equiv \neg p_{\varphi^\#}$, is in $FP^0$, hence we have $I(\neg \varphi^\#) = I(\neg \varphi^\#) = v(p(\neg \varphi^\#)) = v(\neg p_{\varphi^\#}) = 1 - v(p_{\varphi^\#}) = 1 - I(\varphi^\#)$.

(4) $I(\varphi^\# \oplus \psi^\#) = I(\varphi^\#) + I(\psi^\#) - I(\varphi^\# \& \psi^\#)$. This instance of axiom $FP2$, $p(\varphi \oplus \psi)^\# \equiv (p_{\varphi^\#} \rightarrow p_{\psi^\#}) \rightarrow p_{(\varphi \& \psi)^\#}$, is in $FP^0$, hence $I(\varphi^\# \oplus \psi^\#) = I(\varphi^\#) + I(\psi^\#) - I(\varphi^\# \& \psi^\#)$.

Then $M$ is a weak probabilistic Kripke model for $FP(L_n, L)$. Moreover it is
trivial to observe that $\mathcal{M}$ is clearly a model for $\Gamma$, but $\|\Phi\|_\mathcal{M} < 1$. This ends the proof of the theorem. \ $\square$

**Theorem 3.3** The logic $FP(L_n, L)$ is sound and (finite) strongly complete with respect to the class of strong probabilistic Kripke models.

**Proof.** Let $\Gamma \cup \{\Phi\}$ be a finite subset of modal formulas of $FP(L_n, L)$ and let us assume $\Gamma \vdash_{FP} \Phi$. From the above theorem, there is a weak probabilistic Kripke model $\mathcal{M}$ for $FP(L_n, L)$ such that $\|\Psi\|_\mathcal{M} = 1$ for each $\Psi \in \Gamma$, but $\|\Phi\|_\mathcal{M} < 1$. Moreover, without loss of generality we can assume $\mathcal{M} = \langle \Omega_n, e, I \rangle$ to be the weak model defined as in the previous proof. In particular recall that $\Omega_n$ is the set of all the $L_n$-evaluations over the propositional variables $V$, $e : W \times V \rightarrow \{0, 1/n, \ldots, n - 1/n, 1\}$, for each $w \in \Omega_n$ and for each $q \in V$, is defined as $e(w, q) = w(q)$ if $q$ is a propositional variable occurring in $\Gamma \cup \{\Phi\}$ and $e(w, q) = 0$ otherwise, and $I : \text{Func}_{\Omega_n}(V) \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is defined as $I(\varphi) = v(p_{\varphi})$ ($\varphi^\Psi$ being defined as above). The state $I$ defines a probability on formulas $\mu$ by putting $\mu(\varphi) = I(\varphi^\Psi)$.

Now let us recall what Paris has shown in [22]. For each $i = 0, \ldots, n$, the McNaughton theorem ensures the existence of a formula $\psi_i(q)$, defined using just the propositional variable $q$, such that, for each $L_n$-evaluation $w$,

$$w(\psi_i(q)) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } w(q) = i/n, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Now remember that we are working with the finite set $V^0 = \{q_1, \ldots, q_m\}$ of propositional variables, then for each $w \in W$, let $\chi_w$ be the following formula:

$$\chi_w = \psi_{i_1}(q_1) \land \psi_{i_2}(q_2) \land \ldots \land \psi_{i_m}(q_m),$$

where $w(q_r) = i_r/n$. It is easy to see that $w(\chi_w) = 1$ and $w(\chi_{w'}) = 0$ for each $w' \neq w$. Then, under such conditions, Paris shows that the probability $\mu$ is defined as

$$\mu(\varphi) = \sum_{w \in \Omega_n} \mu(\chi_w) \cdot w(\varphi)$$

(see [22] for more details).

Now we define $\mathcal{N} = \langle \Omega_n, e, \sigma \rangle$ where $\Omega_n$ and $e$ are defined as in $\mathcal{M}$, and $\sigma : W \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is defined as $\sigma(w) = \mu(\chi_w)$. Then the following holds:

**Claim B:**

(1) $\sum_{w \in W} \sigma(w) = 1$, i.e. $\mathcal{N}$ is a strong probabilistic Kripke model for $FP(L_n, L)$

(2) For each modal formula $\Theta$, $\|\Theta\|_\mathcal{N} = v(\Theta^\mathcal{N})$. 

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Claim V: So-called common-sense reasoning, the weak and strong disjunction coincide over the $\chi_w$'s, hence we also have

$$L_n \models \bigoplus_{w \in W} \chi_w.$$ 

Moreover, since the $\chi_w$'s are also mutually contradictory, i.e. $L_n \models \chi_w \& \chi_{w'} \equiv \emptyset$ for $w \neq w'$, we also have

$$L_n \models \neg \chi_w \equiv \bigoplus_{w' \neq w} \chi_{w'}.$$ 

Thus we get $FP(L_n, L) \vdash P(\bigoplus_{w \in W} \chi_w)$, and $FP(L_n, L) \vdash \neg P \chi_w \equiv P(\bigoplus_{w' \neq w} \chi_{w'})$.

Now, by (FP3) and taking into account that $\chi_w \& \chi_{w'} \equiv \emptyset$ for $w \neq w'$, we get $FP(L_n, L) \vdash \bigoplus_{w \in W} P \chi_w$ and $FP(L_n, L) \vdash \neg P \chi_w \equiv \bigoplus_{w' \neq w} P \chi_{w'}$, hence

$$FP^\square \models_L \bigoplus_{w \in W} \chi^\square_w,$$

and

$$FP^\square \models_L \neg p_{\chi_w} \equiv \bigoplus_{w' \neq w} \chi^\square_{w'},$$

Then, since $v$ is a model of $FP^\square$, it follows

$$1 = v(\bigoplus_{w \in W} p_{\chi^\square_w}) = \sum_{w \in W} v(p_{\chi^\square_w}) = \sum_{w \in W} \mu(\chi_w) = \sum_{w \in W} \sigma(w).$$

(2) By induction:

- $\Phi = P \varphi$.
  $$\|\Phi\|_M = \sum_w \sigma(w) \cdot \epsilon(w, \varphi) = \sum_w \mu(\chi_w) \cdot w(\varphi) = w(\varphi) = v(p_{\chi^\square_w}) = v(\Phi^\square).$$
- $\Phi = \Psi \circ \Theta$, for $\circ \in \{\&, \rightarrow\}$
  $$\|\Phi\|_M = \|\Psi \circ \Theta\|_M = \|\Psi\|_M \circ \|\Theta\|_M = v(\Psi^\square) \circ v(\Theta^\square) = v((\Psi \circ \Theta)^\square) = v(\Phi^\square).$$

  where $\circ$ is the truth-function corresponding to $\circ$.

Finally, it follows from the above claim that $\|\Psi\|_M = 1$ for each $\Psi \in \Gamma$, but $\|\Phi\|_M < 1$ as desired. This completes the proof.

4 Extensions

In this section we comment on two extensions of the logics $FP(L_n, L)$ regarding the logic used to reason with probability formulas. One is obtained replacing $L$ by the so-called Rational Pavelka logic, RPL, the expansion of...
L with rational truth-constants. The resulting logic $FP(L_n, RPL)$ will allow us to reason with explicit (rational) probability values. The other is obtained replacing $L$ by the stronger logic $LI^1_{\text{F}}$ in order to allow also reasoning with conditional probabilities of fuzzy events.

### 4.1 Extending the logic $FP(L_n, L)$ with rational truth values

In this section we are going to extend the logic $FP(L_n, L)$ with truth-constants for the rational values in $[0, 1]$. The idea underlying this extension is the same as used by Hájek in [13] in order to add the rational values to $FP(L)$. In order to define such an extension we will replace the Łukasiewicz logic $L$ in $FP(L_n, L)$ by the so-called Rational Pavelka logic, $RPL$ for short.

$RPL$ is obtained by adding to the language of $L$ a countable class of truth-constants, one constant $\tau$ for every rational $r \in [0, 1]$. The axioms and rules of $RPL$ are those of $L$ plus the following schema for rational constants (the so-called bookkeeping axioms), namely:

\[
\begin{align*}
(\tau \rightarrow s) & \equiv \min(1, 1 - r + s), \\
(\tau \& s) & \equiv \max(0, r + s - 1),
\end{align*}
\]

for all $r, s \in [0, 1] \cap \mathbb{Q}$. Using $RPL$ as base many-valued logic, we can define the following fuzzy-modal logic.

**Definition 4.1** The language of the logic $FP(L_n, RPL)$ over a countable set of propositional variables $V$ is obtained by adding to the language of $FP(L_n, L)$ a truth-constant $\tau$ for every rational $r \in [0, 1]$. Formulas of $FP(L_n, RPL)$ consist of

(i) the set $Fm(V)$ of non-modal formulas as in the case of $FP(L_n, L)$ (see Definition 2.1).

(ii) the class of modal formulas $RMFm(V)$ is defined as the smallest set of formulas such that, $P(\varphi) \in RMFm(V)$ for each $\varphi \in Fm(V)$, $\tau \in RMFm(V)$ for each $r \in [0, 1] \cap \mathbb{Q}$, and closed under the connectives of Łukasiewicz logic.

The axioms and rules of $FP(L_n, RPL)$ are those of $FP(L_n, L)$ plus the previously defined book-keeping axioms for the truth-constants $\tau$.

The notion of proof, still denoted $\vdash_{FP}$, is defined as usual.

Weak and Strong models for $FP(L_n, RPL)$ are defined as in the case of $FP(L_n, L)$ (see Definition 2.2 and Definition 2.3). The evaluation of $FP(L_n, RPL)$-formulas into a weak (strong) models is defined by adding to Definition 2.2 (Definition 2.3 resp.) a further condition for the truth-constants:
\[ \|\tau\|_M = r. \]

for each \( r \in [0, 1] \cap \mathbb{Q} \) in each weak (strong) probabilistic model \( M \).

Notice that the logic \( FP(L_n, RPL) \) is quite more expressive than \( FP(L_n, L) \). In fact it is now possible to deal with formulas like, for instance, \( P(\varphi) \leftrightarrow \frac{1}{3} \) and \( P(\psi) \rightarrow \frac{1}{3} \) whose intended interpretation is that the probability of \( \varphi \) is \( \frac{1}{3} \) and the probability of \( \psi \) is at most \( \frac{1}{3} \) respectively, and so forth.

From Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.3, it is not difficult to prove that \( FP(L_n, RPL) \) is also sound and (finite) strongly complete w.r.t. both the classes of weak and strong probabilistic models. In fact \( RPL \) is also finitely strong complete (see [13]). This means that, if \( \Gamma \cup \{ \varphi \} \) is a finite \( RPL \)-theory, then \( \Gamma \vdash_{RPL} \varphi \) iff \( e(\varphi) = 1 \) for each \( RPL \)-evaluation \( e \) model of \( \Gamma \).

Let now \( \Gamma \cup \{ \Phi \} \) be a modal theory over \( FP(L_n, RPL) \) and let us assume \( \Gamma \not\vdash_{FP} \Phi \) (where \( \vdash_{FP} \) is now in the sense of \( FP(L_n, RPL) \)). Let \( \boxdot \) be the translation mapping defined as in the proof of Theorem 3.2. Following the same line used in such a proof it is easy to prove that the following hold:

1. \( \Gamma \not\vdash_{FP} \Phi \) iff \( \Gamma \not\vdash_{FP} \Phi \).
2. \( \Gamma \not\vdash_{FP} \Phi \) is a finite \( RPL \)-theory.

Therefore, also in this case it is easy to define (modulo the finite strong standard completeness of \( RPL \)) a weak \( FP(L_n, RPL) \)-model \( M \) such that \( \|\Psi\|_M = 1 \) for each \( \Psi \in \Gamma \), but \( \|\Phi\|_M < 1 \).

It is straightforward to adapt the proof of Theorem 3.3 also to \( FP(L_n, RPL) \), therefore \( FP(L_n, RPL) \) is also finite strong complete w.r.t. the class of strong probabilistic models.

As usual, when we extend a logic by means of rational truth values it is possible to define the notions of provability degree and truth degree of a formula \( \psi \) over an arbitrary theory \( \Gamma \). For \( FP(L_n, RPL) \) they are defined as follows:

**Definition 4.2** Let \( \Gamma \) be an \( FP(L_n, RPL) \) modal theory and let \( \Phi \) be a modal formula. Then, the provability degree of \( \Phi \) over \( \Gamma \) is defined as

\[ |\Phi|_\Gamma = \sup \{ r \in [0, 1] \cap \mathbb{Q} \mid \Gamma \vdash_{FP} \tau \rightarrow \Phi \}, \]

and the truth degree of \( \Phi \) over \( \Gamma \) is defined as

\[ \|\Phi\|_\Gamma = \inf \{ \|\Phi\|_M \mid M \text{ is a weak probabilistic model of } \Gamma \}. \]

Now we are going to show that \( FP(L_n, RPL) \) is Pavelka-style complete. Just as a remark notice that, with respect to this kind of completeness, we are
allowed to relax the hypothesis about the cardinality of the modal theory we are working with. In fact $\Gamma$ is assumed to an arbitrary (countable) theory, not necessarily finite. This is due to the fact that $RPL$ is indeed strong Pavelka-style complete. Now the Pavelka-style completeness for $FP(L_n, RPL)$ reads as follows.

**Theorem 4.3** For each modal theory $\Gamma$ over $FP(L_n, RPL)$ and each modal formula $\Phi$,

$$|\Phi|_\Gamma = \|\Phi\|_\Gamma.$$ 

The proof of this theorem is routine (see for instance [13] Theorem 8.4.9).

We end up this section with the following remark.

**Remark 4.4** Note in the above proof that we have not required the modal theory $\Gamma$ to be finite. This would allow us to also prove a Pavelka-style completeness also for the logic $FP(L, RPL)$ using the same working methodology. This result can be seen as another step forward in the direction of proving the logic $FP(L, L)$ to be finite strong complete w.r.t. the classes of weak and/or strong probabilistic Kripke models.

### 4.2 Towards a logic of conditional probability for fuzzy events

While there seems to be an agreement on the notion of state as the proper generalization of probability on MV-algebras, the generalization of the notion of conditional probability on MV-algebras is a matter of discussion. Indeed, in the last years, different answers have been provided to the question “what is a conditional state?” (see [5,11,15]). Roughly speaking there have been two main approaches: in the first one, exploited in [5,11], and similarly to what happens e.g. in classical probability theory under de Finetti’s interpretation, a conditional state is introduced as a primitive notion, that is, as a two-place function $s(\cdot, \cdot)$ satisfying some basic properties. For instance, Gerla generalizes in [11] a notion of conditional state previously proposed by Di Nola et al. in [5]. The definition is as follows, where $B(\mathcal{A})$ denotes the Boolean skeleton of the MV-algebra $\mathcal{A}$, that is, $B(\mathcal{A}) = \{x \in A \mid x \oplus x = x\}$, which is the largest sub-Boolean algebra of $\mathcal{A}$.

**Definition 4.5** ([11]) A conditional state of an MV-algebra $\mathcal{A}$ is a function $s : A \times B \to [0, 1]$, where $B \subseteq A$ is an MV-bunch\(^1\), satisfying the following

\(^1\) For any MV-algebra $\mathcal{A} = \langle A, \oplus, \neg, 0, 1 \rangle$, $B \subseteq A$ is an MV-bunch if $1 \in B$, $0 \notin B$, and $B$ is closed under $\oplus$. In [11], the following example has been presented: Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an MV-algebra and let $s$ be a state on $\mathcal{A}$, then the set $B = \{x \in A \mid s(x) \neq 0\}$
conditions:

(i) \( s(\cdot \mid y) \) is a state on \( A \) for every \( y \in B \),
(ii) \( s(y \mid y) = 1 \) for each \( y \in B \cap \mathbb{B}(A) \)
(iii) \( s(x \& y \mid z) = s(y \mid z) \cdot s(x \mid y \& z) \) for any \( x \in A, y \in \mathbb{B}(A), z \in B \cap \mathbb{B}(A) \)
such that \( y \& z \in B \),
(iv) \( s(x \mid y) \cdot s(y \mid 1) = s(y \mid x) \cdot s(x \mid 1) \) for any \( x, y \in B \).

The other approach has been essentially developed by Kroupa in [15] where the notion of conditional state has been introduced as definable from the notion of state on a MV-algebra enriched with a product operation. A structure \( A' = (A, \oplus, \odot, \neg, 0) \) is an MV-algebra with product (those algebras are also called PMV-algebras in [19]) if \( A = (A, \oplus, \neg) \) is an MV-algebra and \( \odot \) is a commutative and associative binary operation on \( A \) such that for all \( a, b, c \in A \):

1. \( 1 \odot a = a \),
2. \( a \odot (b \oplus c) = (a \odot b) \oplus (a \odot c) \).

**Definition 4.6 ([15])** Let \( A' = (A, \oplus, \odot, \neg, 0) \) be an MV-algebra with product and let \( s \) be a state on \( A \). Then, a non-negative real number \( s(x \mid y) \) is a conditional state of \( x \) given \( y \) if \( s(x \mid y) \) is any solution of the equation

\[
 s(y) \cdot s(x \mid y) = s(x \odot y).
\]

It is clear that when \( s(y) > 0 \), a conditional state is simply defined as

\[
 s(x \mid y) = \frac{s(x \odot y)}{s(y)}
\]

for all \( x \in A \). In such a case, \( s(\cdot \mid y) \) is a state on \( A \). It is worth noticing here that if we replace in the above definition \( \odot \) by the MV-algebra conjunction \&, then \( s(\cdot \mid y) \) might not be a state any longer.

In this section our aim is provide some ideas about how to extend the approach developed in Sections 4 and 5 to come up with a (fuzzy) logical formalization of conditional probability over MV-events. Since Kroupa’s approach needs to extend the algebra of events with a new product connective, and this brings technical difficulties from the logical point of view, we will:

- keep the modelling of fuzzy events as \( L_n \) propositions
- adopt Gerla and Di Nola et al.’s definition of conditional state as a primitive notion
- adopt the logic \( LFI^1 \) as base fuzzy logic to reason about conditional probabilities of \( L_n \) events.

is an MV-bunch. In this case \( B \) is also said to be the MV-bunch of \( s \).
Recall that the $\text{LII}_2$ logic combines in a single framework both the connectives of Lukasiewicz logic ($\&$, $\rightarrow$) and the connectives of Product logic $\Pi$ ($\&_\Pi$, $\rightarrow_\Pi$), as well as an additional truth-constant $\top$, see [3,4,7] for details. We will define below a logic $\text{FCP}(L_n, \text{LII}_2)$ introducing a binary modality $P$ to deal with conditional states which can be considered as an extension of the logic $\text{FCP}(\Pi)$ developed in [18] for reasoning about conditional probability on classical (Boolean) events.

Indeed, formulas of $\text{FCP}(L_n, \text{LII}_2)$ again split into two classes: (i) the set of non-modal formulas $Fm(V)$, which are formulas of $L_n$ like in $FP(L_n, L)$; and (ii), letting $Sat(V) = \{ \varphi \in Fm(V) \mid L_n \not\vDash \varphi \}$, the set of modal formulas built from atomic modal formulas $P(\varphi \mid \psi)$, with $\varphi \in Fm(V)$ and $\psi \in Sat(V)$, using the connectives and constants of $\text{LII}_2$ ($\&$, $\rightarrow$, $\&_\Pi$, $\rightarrow_\Pi$, $\bar{0}$, $\bar{1}$). Axioms and rules of $FP(L_n, L)$ are as follows, where $\mathbb{B}(V) = \{ \varphi \mid L_n \vDash \varphi \lor \neg \varphi \}$:

- axioms and rules of $L_n$ for non-modal formulas, and axioms and rules of $\text{LII}_2$ for modal formulas
- the following axioms for the modality $P$:
  
  (CP1) $P(\varphi \rightarrow \chi \mid \psi) \rightarrow (P(\varphi \mid \psi) \rightarrow P(\chi \mid \psi))$,
  
  (CP2) $P(\neg \varphi \mid \psi) \equiv \neg P(\varphi \mid \psi)$,
  
  (CP3) $P(\varphi \oplus \chi \mid \psi) \equiv [(P(\varphi \mid \psi) \rightarrow P(\varphi \& \chi \mid \psi)) \rightarrow P(\chi \mid \psi)]$,
  
  (CP4) $P(\psi \mid \psi)$, for each $\psi \in \mathbb{B}(V)$
  
  (CP5) $P(\varphi \& \chi \mid \psi) \equiv P(\chi \mid \psi) \&_\Pi P(\varphi \mid \chi \& \psi)$, for each $\chi, \psi \in \mathbb{B}(V)$
  
  (CP6) $P(\varphi \mid \psi) \&_\Pi P(\psi \mid \top) \equiv P(\psi \mid \varphi) \&_\Pi P(\varphi \mid \top)$

- the rule of necessitation: from $\varphi \equiv \psi$ derive $P(\psi \mid \varphi)$
- the rule of substitution of equivalents: from $\varphi \equiv \psi$ derive $P(\chi \mid \varphi) \equiv P(\chi \mid \psi)$, for $\varphi, \psi \in \mathbb{B}(V)$.

The intended semantics for $\text{FCP}(L_n, \text{LII}_2)$ is given by the class of conditional probabilistic Kripke models $M = (W, e, \mu)$, where:

1. $W$ is a set of worlds and $e : W \times Fm(V) \rightarrow S_n$ is such that $e(w, \cdot)$ is a $S_n$-evaluation for each $w \in W$
2. Let $Fm_W = \{ \varphi^W \mid \varphi \in Fm(V) \}$ be the clan over $W$ as defined in Definition 2.2. Then $\mu$ is a conditional state on $Fm_W \times (Fm_W \setminus \{ \bar{1}^W \})$.
3. $e(w, P(\varphi \mid \psi)) = \mu(\varphi^W, \psi^W)$, if $\psi^W \neq \bar{1}^W$; otherwise let it undefined
4. $e$ is extended to modal formulas using $\text{LII}_2$ truth-functions when defined.

A formal proof of completeness of $\text{FCP}(L_n, \text{LII}_2)$ with respect to this class of models is out of the scope of this paper, but it can be devised combining the techniques used in [18] and in Section 5.
5 Final remarks

In this paper we have presented a fuzzy modal approach to reasoning about the probability of fuzzy events. The very basic idea has been to treat a fuzzy event as a formula of the finitely-valued Łukasiewicz logic $L_n$ instead of classical Boolean logic, and using the notion of state to capture the generalization of finitely additive probability measures on MV-algebras. In this setting we have introduced, for each $n \in \mathbb{N}$, the logic $FP(L_n, L)$ which has been proved to be complete with respect two classes of (Kripke-style) probabilistic models, namely the classes of weak and strong probabilistic models. Two further extensions of $FP(L_n, L)$ have been also sketched, namely the logic $FP(L_n, RPL)$ obtained by enlarging the language of $FP(L_n, L)$ by means of truth constants for the rationals in $[0, 1]$ and $FCP(L_n, L\Pi_{\frac{1}{2}})$ allowing to reason about conditional probability.

Our logical approach to the probability of fuzzy events hides indeed the more general one to generalize the results we have shown holding here (in particular the completeness results), also to a logic allowing to treat the probability of those events which can be modeled by formulas of the whole Łukasiewicz logic and not only every finite valued one. Such a logic (which we have named in the introduction $FP(L, L)$) is easily defined by replacing, in Definition 2.1, the schema $(L_n)$ with the axioms of the whole Łukasiewicz logic. Also the notions of weak and strong models for $FP(L, L)$ can be easily generalized, but, unfortunately, we have not succeeded so far to prove completeness of $FP(L, L)$ with respect to either weak or strong probabilistic models. In such a direction however we have shown some partial results. In particular if the following equality

$$Th(FP(L, L)) = \bigcap_{n \in \mathbb{N}} Th(FP(L_n, L_n)),$$

holds, where $Th$ stands for theorems, then it would be easy to show completeness for $FP(L, L)$. This is an open problem.

Clearly our future work will be devoted either to solve this open problem or to find a new complete axiomatization for the logic $FP(L, L)$. Another important feature that remains to be investigated deals more directly with the notion of fuzzy event. Indeed we have based our investigation interpreting a probability over fuzzy events as a state on a MV-algebra. A more general study could be done by using well-known alternative fuzzy logics, different from Łukasiewicz logic, as logics for the events.
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