Distributed norm management for multi-agent systems

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1. Introduction

A fundamental feature of regulated open multi-agent systems (MAS) in which heterogeneous and autonomous agents interact, is that participating agents are meant to comply with the conventions of the system. Explicit representations of the prohibitions, permissions and obligations associated with software agents – their normative positions (also named deontic states by some authors) – have been used for modeling such conventions, providing a means to regulate the observable behavior of agents (Dignum, 1999; Wooldridge, 2002). Agents’ normative positions change as agents act and interact in pursuit of their goals.

However, norm-compliance, albeit essential, may be difficult to guarantee in practice because agents acquire and discharge obligations, permissions and prohibitions towards other agents in a dynamic fashion. Moreover, even if we assume full norm compliance, this will not necessarily prevent undesirable situations unforeseen at design time. One such undesirable situation is when normative conflicts arise, whereby actions are simultaneously prohibited and obliged (or prohibited and permitted) (Cholvy & Cuppens, 1995; Elhag, Breuker, & Brouwer, 2000; Sartor, 1992; von Wright, 1963). Normative conflicts are undesirable because whatever an agent does (or refrains from doing) violates a norm (Vasconcelos, Kollingbaum, & Norman, 2007, 2009). Such scenarios are particularly complex when agents interact in several concurrent activities and obligations, permissions and prohibitions need to propagate dynamically from one activity to another (or to many others).

We address the problem of regulating the operation of open multi-agent systems in which multiple, concurrent/distributed, interrelated activities take place; the activities are where heterogeneous and autonomous software agents interact. In these circumstances, a centralized representation and/or control of normative positions generates bottlenecks and single points-of-failure that compromise scalability and graceful degradation1 of the multi-agent system’s functionalities. The study of computational models that tackle the distributed management of norms is a little-explored issue which our work looks into.

We introduce normative structures as a means to observe and manage the evolution of normative positions in each activity and to manage the propagation of normative positions between agents act and interact in pursuit of their goals.
distributed activities. We propose an algorithm that exploits the distributed nature of normative structures to deal, at run time, with the emergence of conflicts as agents interact – the algorithm detects and resolves normative conflicts as they arise during the execution of a MAS. We provide guarantees to our algorithm, namely, correctness, termination and worst-case complexity.

To make the problem amenable to analysis, we make the following assumptions:

- We assume that MAS are open inasmuch as agents' internal states are inaccessible to the system and agents may enter and leave the MAS as long as they comply with norms. We also assume that agents have the abilities to comply with norms, and will perform “legitimate” actions. We only consider agent actions consisting of speech acts (Searle, 1969) (or actions which may be represented as speech acts, as in, for instance, truthfully informing the concerned parties about actions performed).
- We assume that MAS regulations belong to two types. The first type is embedded in constitutive and procedural norms that are regimented and outside the control of participating agents. The second type corresponds to non-regimented functional norms. Following (Boella, Pigozzi, & Van der Torre, 2009), we do not assume any governance mechanism aside from the regimentation imposed by the MAS itself, thus agents may choose to violate a non-regimented norm. Hence, we do not assume full norm compliance by the agents – we deal with any normative conflicts that may arise not only from violation of a norm but from the normative inconsistencies inherent in the system and brought about by agent interactions. Additionally, we do not assume that there are meta-level or second-level rules that govern the change of existing rules, hence we will not address the problem of norm change as such.
- We make assumptions about the structuring of agent interactions: agents interact in repetitive activities regulated by their own particular conventions (procedural and functional). Several of these activities may be simultaneously happening at any given time, with possibly many instances of one same activity. An agent may participate in one activity with other agents and in another activity with possibly different agents. Moreover, an agent may participate simultaneously in more than one activity and may move from one activity to another (or many others). The actions an agent performs in one activity may cause updates in the agents' normative positions, and this may affect the actions agents perform in the future, in that or in other activities.

Some of these assumptions refer to more operational aspects of the problem, and we will elaborate upon them in the rest of the paper. In Sections 6 and 7 we discuss further assumptions and how to relax them. It is worth mentioning that, like most work in this field, our representation is expressive enough to capture many useful normative concepts in the literature. Although the formalism of (García-Camino et al., 2009) is more sophisticated than the one we use in the present paper, the simplification does not affect our contributions in the present paper; in Section 7 we explain how we deal with richer languages.

The structure of this paper is as follows. In the remainder of this section we introduce a scenario to serve as a running example throughout the article. In Section 2 we present basic concepts and formally define normative structures. In Section 3 we define normative conflicts. Section 4 presents an algorithm for conflict resolution. Section 5 elaborates on an architecture that allows the distributed management of normative positions and solves conflicts via the algorithm presented in Section 4. Finally, we survey related work in Section 6, and draw conclusions and comment on future work in Section 7.

1.1. Scenario

To illustrate and motivate our exposition we use a supply-chain scenario in which companies and individuals come together in an (electronic) marketplace to conduct business. The overall transaction procedure may be organized as six activities, represented as oval nodes in the diagram of Fig. 1. They involve different participants whose behavior is coordinated through protocols (that is, pre-defined sequences of messages with a shared content language). In this scenario agents can play one of four roles: accountant (represented as acc), client, supplier (represented as supp) and warehouse manager (represented as wm). The triangles represent transitions among activities, that is, “meeting points” where agents synchronize their movements out of an activity and into another activity (or choice of other activities) (Arcos, Esteva, Noriega, Rodríguez-Aguilar, & Sierra, 2005). The lines and arrows connecting activities and transitions indicate the order in which activities can be undertaken.

After registering at the marketplace, clients and suppliers get together in the negotiation activity where they agree on the terms of their transaction, i.e. prices, amounts of goods to be delivered, deadlines and other details. In the contract activity, the order becomes established and an invoice is prepared. The client will then participate in a payment activity, verifying his credit-worthiness and instructing his bank to transfer the correct amount of money. The supplier in the meantime will arrange for the goods to be delivered (e.g., via a warehouse manager) in the delivery activity. Finally, agents can leave the marketplace conforming to a predetermined exit protocol. The marketplace accountant participates in most of the activities as a trusted provider of auditing services. In the remainder of this article we shall build on this scenario to exemplify the notion of normative structure and to illustrate our approach to conflict detection and resolution in a distributed setting.

2. Normative structures

As argued above, we consider that the specification of an open and regulated MAS encompasses the specification of a coordination level and a normative level. This allows the designer to separate concerns. On the one hand, the designer can concentrate on

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2 Those regimented procedural rules are expressed either as protocols that organize procedural prescriptions in each activity, or as conventions that regulate when agents may move from one activity to another.
modeling interactions within activities along with the dependencies between activities when specifying the coordination level. As a result, the designer can produce a specification like the one in Fig. 1. Agents in a MAS will then be able to interact according to the protocols of the activities specified at the coordination level; such activities can be naturally enacted in a distributed fashion. As an activity evolves, normative positions may change due to agents’ actions. For instance, when a seller agrees on a contract, it is expected to deliver certain goods. Furthermore, actions in one activity may have an effect on the enactment of other activities. Using the running example, one can consider negotiation, contract-signing and delivery as different (but related) activities. A contract may be created during the negotiation activity, it may be agreed during the contract-signing activity, and it may be (partially) fulfilled during the delivery activity. Therefore, the specification of the triggering and removal of normative positions becomes essential at the normative level. Hereafter, we focus on offering the MAS designer a formalism that eases the specification of the activation and removal of normative positions.

Actions and/or normative positions in some activity cause changes in the normative positions of agents in other activities. We are concerned with the propagation of normative positions within a network of distributed activities as a consequence of agents’ actions. We refer to the normative state of an activity as the set of normative positions that are in force at a particular moment during the enactment of the activity. Furthermore, a normative transition defines how a change in a normative state affects the normative state of other activities. As for effects of actions, a normative structure includes both of these notions (normative states and normative transitions) to establish the existing relationships among different activities. In order to define our norm language and specify how normative positions are propagated, we have been inspired by multi-context systems (Giunchiglia & Serafini, 1994).

In this section, we present a simple language capturing these aspects and introduce the notions of normative states, normative transition and normative structure formally. We give the intended semantics of these concepts and show an example of how a MAS can be regulated via normative positions.

2.1. Basic concepts

In this subsection we introduce the basic concepts needed to define a normative structure. The building blocks of our language are terms and atomic formulae:

**Definition 1.** A term, denoted generically as $\tau$, is a constant, a variable or a functional expression $f^{\ell}(\tau_0, \ldots, \tau_n)$, where $f$ is an $n$-ary function symbol and all $\tau_i$, for $0 \leq i \leq n$, are terms.

Constants, generically denoted as $a$, $b$, $c$ (possibly with subscripts), are strings starting with a lowercase letter, with or without subscripts, as in, e.g., seller$_3$, copper. Variables, generically denoted as $x$, $w$, $x$, $y$, $z$ (possibly with subscripts), are strings starting with an uppercase letter, with or without subscripts, as in, e.g., Role$_5$, Price. We build atomic formulae using terms as parameters:

**Definition 2.** An atomic formula is any construct $p^n(\tau_0, \ldots, \tau_m)$, where $p^n$ is an $m$-ary predicate symbol and all $\tau_i$, for $0 \leq i \leq m$, are terms.

We make use of first-order substitutions (Apt, 1997; Fitting, 1990), formally defined as:

**Definition 3.** A substitution $\sigma = \{x_0/\tau_0, \ldots, x_n/\tau_n\}$ is a finite and possibly empty set of pairs $x_i/\tau_i$, $0 \leq i \leq n$, $x_i$ being a variable and $\tau_i$ a term as defined above.

We define the application of a substitution in accordance with (Fitting, 1990) – a substitution $\sigma$ is a unifier of two terms $\tau_1$, $\tau_2$, iff $\tau_1 \cdot \sigma = \tau_2 \cdot \sigma$, "='' being defined as:

**Definition 4.** The application of a substitution $\sigma$ to a term or atomic formula is as follows:

1. $c \cdot \sigma = c$ for a constant $c$;
2. $x \cdot \sigma = x$ if $x/\tau \in \sigma$; otherwise $x \cdot \sigma = x$;
3. $f^{\ell}(\tau_0, \ldots, \tau_n) \cdot \sigma = f^{\ell}(\tau_0 \cdot \sigma, \ldots, \tau_n \cdot \sigma)$.
4. $p^n(\tau_0, \ldots, \tau_m) \cdot \sigma = p^n(\tau_0 \cdot \sigma, \ldots, \tau_m \cdot \sigma)$.

We focus on an expressive class of MASs in which interaction is carried out by means of illocutionary speech acts exchanged among participating agents. We initially define illocution schemata:

**Definition 5.** An illocution schema $\iota$ is any atomic formula $p(\tau_1, \tau_2, \tau_3, \tau_4, \tau_5, \tau_6)$ where

- $p$ is an element of a set of illocutionary particles (e.g., inform, request, etc.);
- $\tau_1$, $\tau_3$ are variables or agent identifiers;
- $\tau_2$, $\tau_4$ are variables or role identifiers;
- $\tau_5$ is a variable or an arbitrary term representing the contents of a message, built from a shared language;
- $\tau_6$ is a variable or $a \in \mathbb{N}$ representing a time stamp.

The intuitive meaning of $p(\text{Agent}_R, \text{Agent}_{Ag'}, R', m, t)$ is that agent $Ag$ playing role $R$ has sent message $m$ to agent $Ag'$ playing role $R'$ at time $t$. We differentiate a subclass of illocution schemata which do not contain any variables, that is, they are ground atomic formulae. We name this subclass the illocutions and these are generically denoted as $\iota$. An example of an illocution is inform$(\text{agent}_{1}, \text{supp}_{2}, \text{client}_{3}, \text{offer}_{4}(\text{wire}_{5}, 12), 10)$.

We now define normative positions:

**Definition 6.** Normative positions, generically referred to as $N$, are of the form $\text{per}(\iota), \text{prh}(\iota)$ or $\text{obl}(\iota)$, respectively, a permission, a prohibition or an obligation on an illocution schema $\iota$.

A normative position $\text{per}(p(\text{Ag}, \text{Ag'}, R', m, t))$ intuitively means that agent $Ag$ playing role $R$ is permitted to send message $m$ to agent $Ag'$ playing role $R'$ until time $t$. A normative position $\text{prh}(p(\text{Ag}, \text{Ag'}, R', m, t))$ means that agent $Ag$ playing role $R'$ is prohibited from...
I

per
to
time 20) to deliver 50 kg of copper to be at or after the time of the norm establishment
more prohibited from delivering 25 kg of iron to generated; however,
t
Definition 7. A normative state Λ, of an activity s is a finite set of pairs (I,t) (illocutions) or (N,t) (normative positions), t ∈ N, representing, respectively, that I was uttered at instant t and normative position N was established at t.

Normative states record both the events (what was uttered and when) and the normative positions occurring in an activity. In a pair (p(\{ag, r, ag', r', t, f\}), t) ∈ Λ, it is always the case that t = f, that is, the time the illocution was uttered and their time as recorded in Λ are always the same.\(^6\) In a pair (obl[p(\{ag, r, ag', r', t, f\}), t] ∈ Λ, t may be different from t, as t is time by when the illocution ought to be uttered and t is the time when the normative position was generated; however, t' > t, that is, the time t' of the illocution must be at or after the time of the norm establishment t. The same applies to per and prh.

A sample normative state of the delivery activity of our scenario (referred as dlvry), denoted as \(\Lambda_{dlvry}\), is:

\[
\{(\text{inform bob, seller, kev, wm, deliverwire, 200), 20}),\} \quad \{(\text{obl inform kev, wm, bob, client, delivercopper, 50), 30})),\} \quad \{(\text{prh inform kev, wm, ann, client, deliveriron, 25), 30})),\}
\]

In the normative state above, agent bob taking up the seller role has delivered 200 kg of wire at time 20 to agent kev taking up the warehouse manager role wm.\(^6\) Agent kev has an obligation (established at time 20) to deliver 50 kg of copper to b ib by time 30; kev is furthermore prohibited from delivering 25 kg of iron to ann, another client, until time 30.

The meaning of normative positions in a normative state is as follows: a pair (per\{inform ag, ag', r, t, T\}, T) ∈ Λ means that agent ag under role r is permitted to send an inform message with contents c to agent ag' under role r' from the time T when the normative position was established up until the time stamp T, T ≤ T. Similarly, (obl\{inform ag, ag', r, t, T\}, T) ∈ Λ means that agent ag under role r is obliged to send the inform message to ag' between the time T of the norm establishment until T, and (prh\{inform ag, ag', r, t, T\}, T) ∈ Λ means that agent ag under role r is prohibited from sending the inform message to ag' between T and T.

A more useful way to capture the meaning of normative positions is by describing norm violations, that is, those circumstances when one can infer that an agent behaved in a non-norm compliant fashion (Aldewereld, Vázquez-Salceda, Dignum, & Meyer, 2005). Given a normative state Λ and the current time \(t_{now}\), we can define the conditions for the violation of an obligation as "if there is an obligation of the form \(\text{obl}[p(t_1, t_2, t_3, t_4, t_5)]\), \(t_1 \in \Lambda, t_2 \leq t_{now}\), and there is no illocution of the form \(p(t'_1, t'_2, t'_3, t'_4, t'_5)\), \(t'_1 \in \Lambda, t'_4 < \Lambda\), such that \(p(t_1, t_2, t_3, t_4, t_5) \cdot \sigma = p(t'_1, t'_2, t'_3, t'_4, t'_5) \cdot \sigma\), for some substitution \(\sigma\), and \(t'_2 \leq t_{now}\), then a violation of the obligation has occurred – the obliged utterance was not uttered by \(t_{now}\), the obligation 'deadline'".\(^5\) Similarly, we address a prohibition violation: we specify the conditions establishing when the prohibited utterance was proffered within the prohibition 'period'. One way to define the violation of permissions is via the description of those situations when an utterance which is not explicitly permitted has been proffered; this is rather strict, but it may be required in highly regulated agent encounters. Alternative formulations can be given to the norm violations above, such as the ones defined in (García-Camino et al., 2009).

Normative states evolve over time: as agents interact, their utterances are recorded; these utterances may cause normative positions to appear or disappear. Activities are connected to one another via normative transitions that specify how utterances and normative positions in one activity (represented in its normative state) affect other activities. Illocutions uttered in one activity may have an effect in other activities. Normative transitions define the conditions under which a normative position is updated. These conditions are either utterances and/or norms associated with a given activity, which cause the addition or removal of a normative position, possibly in a distinct activity. We capture dynamic aspects of norms (and their relationships across distinct activities) via normative transitions:

Definition 8. A normative transition NT is defined as:

\[
\text{NT} := \{\text{LH} \Rightarrow \text{RH}\}
\]

\[
\text{LH} := (\text{id} : D)\text{LH}, \text{LH}
\]

\[
\text{D} := \{\text{id} : N\}
\]

\[
\text{N} := \{\text{per(\{prh\{\text{obl}\})\})}, \text{id} : N\}
\]

\[
\text{RH} := (\text{id} : D) \cup (\text{id} : N)
\]

where i is an illocution schema, N is a normative position, id is the identifier of an activity and RH is the addition or removal of a normative position.

We endow our language of Definition 8 above with the usual operational semantics of rule-based languages, as formalized in (García-Camino et al., 2009), and which we informally describe below. Our language adds (via operator "\(\bowtie\)" or removes (via operator "\(\setminus\)") normative positions to/from normative states, capturing dynamic aspects of norms: as agents interact, normative positions are assigned and revoked (that is, removed). For instance, if an agent bids in an auction, then an obligation is put in place for the agent to pay for the item; agents that have not registered with a third party to obtain a letter of credit are forbidden to bid; an obligation to pay is removed if the agent to whom the obligation refers performs the payment. We show in Fig. 2 sample normative transitions. Normative transition \(nt_{s}\) is not part of our running example, but we included it to illustrate the situation when an obligation is in place and it is fulfilled – the obligation is then removed from the normative state. We discuss the other examples in Section 2.3. Based on the notion of normative transition, we can offer a straightforward definition of normative structure:

Definition 9. A normative structure is a pair \((S, NT)\), where \(S\) is a finite set of normative states and \(NT\) is a finite set of normative transitions.

In other words, specifying a normative structure amounts to specifying a rule-based program (a collection of rules) that makes explicit how normative positions flow between the normative states of activities and how they are removed as agents interact. Therefore, the triggering of normative transitions changes normative states by adding and removing normative positions.

Here we give the intuitive semantics of normative transitions by describing how they change normative states. Given a normative transition, we refer to the activities on the left-hand side of the rule as incoming activities and the activities on the right-hand side of the rule as outgoing activities. Each transition is triggered once for each substitution that unifies the left-hand side LH of

\[^5\] Hereafter we drop the index of a normative state that refers to its activity unless it is required to distinguish between normative states of different activities.

\[^6\] Following the terminology from (Searle, 1995) and the computational model of an activity from (García-Camino et al., 2009), we design our MAS in order to incorporate that informing about a delivery "counts as" a factual delivery.
the transition with a set of elements from possibly several normative states of its incoming activities. An utterance or a normative position on the left-hand side of a transition holds if, and only if, it unifies with an utterance or normative position appearing in the normative state of an incoming activity. Every time a transition is triggered, the update specified on the right-hand side of that transition is carried out, thus adding to or removing from the normative state of an activity a normative position.

Conflicts may arise after the addition of normative positions: if a conflict arises, we may use an algorithm to decide whether to ignore the new normative position or to "adjust" old normative positions to avoid conflicts. We explain this in more detail in Sections 3 and 4.

2.3. Example

We now discuss normative transitions \( nt_1, \ldots, nt_4 \) of Fig. 2 for our scenario of Section 1.1. Normative transition \( nt_1 \) illustrates how one single normative state can be modified; \( nt_2 \) makes reference to more than one normative state in its left-hand side. Finally, \( nt_3 \) and \( nt_4 \) illustrate a "normative flow" whereby the appearance of a new obligation in one normative state generates other obligations in different normative states.

In our scenario, during the negotiation activity (represented as \( ngn \)), a request of a buyer \( B \) to a seller \( S \) to sell an amount \( A \) of item \( I \) at price \( P \) leads to the introduction of a normative position in the same normative state. The normative position is a permission for \( S \) to accept the request of \( B \). This is formalized by normative transition \( nt_1 \). Notice that the request to sell issued by buyer \( B \) within the negotiation activity would change the negotiation normative state, allowing the firing of \( nt_1 \).

In the negotiation activity (\( ngn \)), if a seller \( S \) accepts the offer of a buyer \( B \) to sell an amount \( A \) of item \( I \) at price \( P \) and furthermore, if in the payment activity (represented as \( pmnt \)) the same buyer has paid \( P \) to seller \( S \), then that introduces to the delivery activity an obligation on the seller agent to deliver the sold item. This is captured by normative transition \( nt_2 \). The illocutions uttered within the negotiation and payment activities would change the negotiation normative state and payment normative state respectively, triggering the obligation in the delivery normative state.

During the delivery activity (\( dlvry \)), the creation of an obligation on seller \( S \) to deliver copper leads to the propagation to the distribution activity (\( dstr \)) of an obligation on distributor \( D \) to deliver that amount of copper to \( s_1 \). We represent this as \( nt_3 \). Finally, during the distribution activity, the creation of an obligation on the distributor \( D \) to deliver some copper allows the propagation to the manufacture activity (\( mnfc \)) of an obligation on \( nt_1 \) playing a manufacturer role \( M \) to deliver that amount of copper to \( D \). This is captured by \( nt_4 \).

3. Normative conflicts

In this article, normative positions refer to illocutions (as opposed to arbitrary actions). Normative conflicts arise when an illocution is simultaneously obliged and prohibited. The terms deontic conflict and deontic inconsistency have been used interchangeably in the literature to refer to situations in which actions are simultaneously associated with different modalities (von Wright, 1963). However, in this article we adopt the view of (Elhag et al., 2000) in which the authors suggest that a deontic inconsistency arises when an action is simultaneously permitted and prohibited – since a permission may not be acted upon, no conflict actually occurs. The situation when an action is simultaneously obliged and prohibited is, however, a normative conflict, as both obligations and prohibitions influence agents’ behaviors in a conflicting fashion.

We use unification of first-order terms (Apt, 1997; Fitting, 1990) as a means to detect and resolve conflicts between normative positions. Unification is a fundamental problem in automated theorem proving and many algorithms have been proposed (Fitting, 1990). Unification is based on the concept of substitution (viz. Def. 3 and 4), that is, the set of values for variables in a computation. We shall use unification in the following way:

**Definition 10.** \( unify(\tau_1, \tau_2, \sigma) \) holds iff \( \tau_1: \sigma = \tau_2: \sigma \), for some \( \sigma \); \( unify(p^n(\tau_0, \ldots, \tau_m), p^n(\tau'_0, \ldots, \tau'_m), \sigma) \) holds iff \( \text{unify}(\tau_i, \tau'_i, \sigma) \), \( 0 \leq i \leq n \), and some \( \sigma \).

We assume that \( unify \) is based on a suitable implementation of a unification algorithm that (i) always terminates (possibly failing, if a unifier cannot be found), (ii) is correct and (iii) is of linear computational complexity. The \( unify \) relationship checks, on the one hand, that substitution \( \sigma \) is a unifier, but can also be used to find \( \sigma \). By extending the definition of \( unify \) for handling normative positions, we can use unification for detecting a conflict between two normative positions:

**Definition 11.** A conflict arises between two normative positions \( N \) and \( N' \) under a substitution \( \sigma \), denoted as \( \text{conflict}([N, N', \sigma]) \), if and only if \( N = \text{prl}([N, N', \sigma]) \).

We assume that this payment was made for item \( I \). An appropriate labeling during the procurement process is needed but omitted here for simplicity.
That is, a prohibition and an obligation are in conflict if, and only if, their illocutions unify under $\sigma$. The substitution $\sigma$, called here the conflict set, unifies the agents, roles, and atomic formulae. For instance, an obligation to every agent $A_1$ enacting any role at any time to inform deliver(copper,X) to any agent $A_2$ enacting any role at any time, represented as

$$obl(\text{inform}(A_1, R_1, A_2, R_2, \text{deliver}(copper, X), T))$$

and a prohibition on an specific agent $a_1$ enacting the specific role $r_1$ to inform deliver(Y, dest) to another specific agent $a_2$ enacting specifically role $r_2$ in any time $T$, represented as

$$prh(\text{inform}(a_1, r_1, a_2, r_2, \text{deliver}(Y, dest), T))$$

are in conflict as their illocutions unify under

$$\sigma = \{A_1/a_1, R_1/r_1, A_2/a_2, R_2/r_2, Y/copper, X/\text{dest}, T/T\}$$

Agent $a_1$ under role $r_1$ is simultaneously obliged and forbidden to deliver copper to agent $a_2$ under role $r_2$ at a particular destination dest.

Inconsistencies caused by the same illocution being simultaneously permitted and prohibited can be formalized similarly. In this article we focus on prohibition/obligation conflicts, but the computational machinery introduced in Section 4 can equally be used to detect prohibition/permission inconsistencies, if we replace $obl$ with $per$.

4. Conflict resolution

Once a conflict (as defined in Section 3) has been detected, we propose to employ the unifier to resolve the conflict. By conflict resolution we mean the careful manipulation of normative positions aiming at restricting the value their variables may have, thus eliminating any conflicts. In our approach, normative positions are annotated with substitutions representing values their variables must not have, in order to avoid any conflicts with other normative positions.

In our example of Section 3, if the variables in $prh(\text{inform}(a_1, r_1, a_2, r_2, \text{deliver}(Y, dest), T))$ do not get the values specified in substitution $\sigma = \{A_1/a_1, R_1/r_1, A_2/a_2, R_2/r_2, Y/copper, X/\text{dest}, T/T\}$ then there will be no conflicts, that is, there are no conflicts as long as the prohibition does not address the delivery of copper (the other pairs of unifications do not affect the prohibition, though). However, rather than computing the complement set of a substitution (that is, all possible values for variables which do not unify – these can be an infinite set) we propose to annotate the prohibition with the unifier itself and use it to determine what the variables of that prohibition cannot be in future unifications in order to avoid a conflict. We therefore denote annotated prohibitions as $\text{prh}[\bar{\text{I}}] \ominus \Sigma$, where $\Sigma = \{\sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_n\}$, is a set of unifiers. Annotated normative positions are interpreted as deontic constructs with curtailed influences (Vasconcelos, Kollingebaum, & Norman, 2009), that is, their effect (on agents, roles and illocutions) has been limited by the set $\Sigma$ of unifiers. Permissions and obligations do not get annotations: they remain in their original format.

A prohibition may be in conflict with various obligations in a given normative state $\Delta$ and we need to record (and possibly avoid) all these conflicts. We define below an algorithm which ensures that a normative position will be added to a normative state in such a way that it will not cause any conflicts. We propose a fine-grained way of resolving normative conflicts via unification. We detect the overlapping of the normative positions’ influences, i.e. how they affect the behavior of the concerned agents, and we curtail the influence of the normative position by appropriately using the annotations when checking if the normative position applies to illocutions. Algorithm 1 depicts how we manage the insertion of a normative position $N$ into a normative state $\Delta$ obtaining a set of additions/removals of normative positions $Cs$. These updates make use of prohibitions annotated with a set $\Sigma = \{\sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_n\}$ of conflict sets $\sigma_i$ indicating which bindings for variables have to be avoided for conflicts not to take place.

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Algorithm 1. manageNorm

Input: $\equiv(s : N), \Delta$

Output: $Cs$

1: $t_c := \text{current\_time}();$
2: $\text{case N of}$
3: $\text{(per)}()$: $Cs := \{ \ominus (s : N)\}$
4: $\text{(prh)}(\bar{\text{I}})$: if $\exists (N', t) \in \Delta$, $t \leq t_c$, conflict($N, N', \sigma$) then
5: $\text{Cs} := \{ \ominus (s : N \ominus \Sigma) \}$
6: $\text{else}$
7: $Cs := \{ \ominus (s : N \ominus \Sigma) \}$
8: $prh(\bar{\text{I}})$:
9: $\begin{array}{l}
10: \Sigma := \emptyset \\
11: \text{for all } (N', t) \in \Delta, t \leq t_c, \text{conflict}(N, N', \sigma) \text{ do}
12: \Sigma := \Sigma \cup \{ \sigma \}
13: \text{Cs} := \{ \ominus (s : N \ominus \Sigma) \}$
14: \end
15: $obl(\bar{\text{I}})$:
16: $\begin{array}{l}
17: \text{Cs} := \{ \ominus (s : N) \}
18: \text{for all } (N' \ominus \Sigma), t \in \Delta, t \leq t_c, \text{conflict}(N', N, \sigma) \text{ do}
19: \text{if } N' = \text{prh}(\bar{\text{I}}) \text{ then}
20: \text{Cs} := \text{Cs} \cup \{ \ominus (s : N' \ominus \Sigma) \}
21: \text{else}
22: \text{if } \sigma \notin \Sigma \text{ then}
23: \text{Cs} := \text{Cs} \cup \{ \ominus (s : N' \ominus \Sigma), \ominus (s : N \ominus \Sigma) \}
24: \text{end}
25: \text{end case}
26: \text{return Cs}
\end{array}$
```

The algorithm uses a case of structure to differentiate the kinds of normative positions $N$ to be inserted. Line 3 addresses the case when $N$ is a permission: in this case, the set of commands $Cs$ consists of a single command to add $N$ (since it is a permission, it does not have annotations). Lines 4–7 address the case when we attempt to add a ground prohibition on $\bar{\text{I}}$ to a normative state: if it conflicts with any obligation in $\Delta$ established before or at the current time (that is, $t \leq t_c$), then it is discarded (Line 5); otherwise $Cs$ will contain a command to insert the new normative position (with an empty annotation) to the appropriate state (Line 7). Lines 8–14 describe the situation when $N$ is a provision on a non-ground illocution schema $I$. In this case, the algorithm initializes an annotation $\Sigma$ as an empty set and loops (Lines 11–12) through the normative positions $N'$ established before or at the current time (that is, $t \leq t_c$) and which are in conflict with $N$. For each of such normative positions $N'$, the algorithm updates $\Sigma$ by adding the newly found conflict set $\sigma$ to it. By looping through $\Delta$, we are able to check any conflicts between the new prohibition and all existing obligations, adequately building the annotation $\Sigma$ to be used in the command to include the annotated normative position $N \ominus \Sigma$ in Line 13.

Lines 15–24 describe how obligations are dealt with: obligations are always added, hence $Cs$ is initialized to $\{ \ominus (s, N) \}$ (Line 17). However, the new obligation may be in conflict with existing prohibitions in $\Delta$, hence the algorithm defines a loop (Lines 18–23) through all annotated prohibitions $(N, t) \in \Delta$, whose activation time $t$ is less than or equal to the current time $t_c$, and which
are in conflict with N, under $\sigma$. For each prohibition in this loop, we must check if it concerns a ground illocution (Line 19) – in this case, we add a command in Cs to remove the ground prohibition (its annotation is the empty set). If the prohibition concerns a non-ground illocution, then we must check whether the conflict set $\sigma \notin \Sigma$: if $\sigma \in \Sigma$ then the conflict does not really happen as the curtailed prohibition does not overlap with N. If there is indeed a conflict (that is, $\sigma \notin \Sigma$) then we must update the annotation $\Sigma$ of the prohibition to add the new conflict set $\sigma$ – we do so by creating two commands in Cs, one to remove the old normative position, viz. $\varnothing(s : N \setminus \Sigma)$ and one to add the new updated normative position, viz. $\varnothing(s : N \cup \{\sigma\})$ (Line 23).

The loops in our algorithm guarantee that an exhaustive (linear) search through a normative state takes place, checking if the new normative position is in conflict with any existing prohibitions/obligations, possibly updating the annotations of any conflicting prohibitions. The algorithm is correct in that, for a given normative position and a normative state, it provides a (possibly empty) set of updates adding new normative positions to $\Delta$ or changing existing normative positions, ensuring that $\Delta$ remains conflict-free, that is, after the commands in Cs are applied to a (possibly empty) conflict-free $\Delta$, $\Delta$ remains conflict-free. The prohibitions in $\Delta$, however, all have annotations recording how they unify with existing obligations. The annotations can be empty, though: this is the case when we have a ground prohibition or a prohibition which does not unify/conflict with any obligation. Permissions do not affect our algorithm and they are appropriately dealt with (Line 3). Any attempt to insert a ground prohibition which conflicts, yields an empty set of updates in normative positions (Line 4). When a new obligation is being added then the algorithm guarantees that all prohibitions are considered (Lines 15–24), leading to updates for the removal of conflicting ground prohibitions or the change of annotations of non-ground prohibitions. The algorithm always terminates: the loops are over a finite set $\Delta$ and the conflict checks always terminate. The complexity of the algorithm is linear: the set $\Delta$ is only examined once for each possible case of normative position to be added.

We illustrate how our algorithm works with an example from the scenario of Section 2. Let us suppose that agents are participating in a negotiation activity that we will call $d$. For reasons of space, let us assume that agent $a_1$ informing agent $a_2$ of $p(l,p)$ counts as $a_1$ paying the amount $P$ for item 1 to $a_2$. Furthermore, let us suppose that agent $a_1$ has not fulfilled a previous contract with $a_2$ while participating in this new negotiation activity yielding new pending obligations. We may forbid agent $a_1$ to obtain more obligations with regard to agent $a_2$ until it fulfills the currently pending ones. Then let us suppose we invoke the algorithm with the following parameters:

1. The update $\varnothing(s : N)$ to be processed is

$$\varnothing(d : \text{prh}(\text{inform}(a_1, r_1, a_2, r_2, p(X, Y, Z))))$$

The update represents a prohibition on agent $a_1$ to pay agent $a_2$ for any item at any price.

2. The current normative state $\Delta$ of activity $d$ is

$$\Delta = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \{ \text{obl}(\text{inform}(a_1, r_1, a_2, r_2, p(1, 2, 3))) \}, \\ \{ \text{obl}(\text{inform}(a_1, r_1, a_2, r_2, p(10, 20, 30))) \}, \\ \{ \text{obl}(\text{inform}(a_1, r_1, a_2, r_2, p(X, Y, Z))) \}, \\ \text{obl}(\text{inform}(a_1, r_1, a_2, r_2, p(10, 20, 30))) \} \right\}$$

In our example, agent $a_1$ is obliged to pay agent $a_2$ 2 Euros for item 1 and 20 Euros for item 10.

The algorithm will provide us with a set Cs of updates required to accommodate the input update, ensuring $\Delta$ is kept conflict-free.

Let us assume that the current time is 40, thus both normative positions in $\Delta$ are active. The example is handled by the third case (Lines 8–14): the set $\Sigma$ is initialized to $\emptyset$ (Line 10) then a loop is executed (Line 11) where each of the normative positions in $\Delta$ is considered in turn, being checked for a conflict with the input update. In our example, we have:

$$\text{conflict}(\text{prh}(\text{inform}(a_1, r_1, a_2, r_2, p(X, Y, Z))), \text{obl}(\text{inform}(a_1, r_1, a_2, r_2, p(1, 2, 3))), \sigma_1)$$

$$\text{conflict}(\text{prh}(\text{inform}(a_1, r_1, a_2, r_2, p(X, Y, Z))), \text{obl}(\text{inform}(a_1, r_1, a_2, r_2, p(10, 20, 30))), \sigma_2)$$

where $\sigma_1 = \{X(1, Y(2, Z(3))\}$ and $\sigma_2 = \{X(10, Y(20, Z(30))\}$, hence the algorithm computes $\Delta = \{\sigma_1, \sigma_2\}$. In Line 13, the set of updates Cs is computed, that is,

$$Cs = \{ \{d : \text{prh}(\text{inform}(a_1, r_1, a_2, r_2, p(X, Y, Z))) \} \cup \{ \sigma_1, \sigma_2 \} \}$$

The annotation ensures that the prohibition does not have values which overlap with those of the obligations.

Although we propose to curtail prohibitions, the same machinery introduced above can be used to define the curtailment of obligations or permissions instead. Different policies (that is, which normative position should be preserved and which one should be curtailed) are dependent on the intended deontic semantics and requirements of the systems addressed.

5. A distributed architecture for normative structures

In this section we propose an architecture, expanded and adapted from (García-Camino, Rodríguez-Aguilar, & Vasconcelos, 2008), to address the regulation of the behavior of autonomous agents and the management of the normative state(s) of the MAS, including the management of normative positions and the resolution of normative conflicts. We assume the existence of heterogeneous, selfish agents that interact in order to pursue their goals – we do not have control on these agents’ internal functioning, nor can we anticipate it.

We propose to extend AMELI (Esteva et al., 2004), an agent-based infrastructure that allows the enactment of open multi-agent systems as electronic institutions. Such extension allows us to inherit all the features of AMELI, including, very importantly, its capability of regulating open multi-agent systems. The architecture of AMELI is divided into three (logical) layers, illustrated in Fig. 3, namely:

- Autonomous agent layer – the set of external agents taking part in the MAS.
- Social layer – an infrastructure that mediates and facilitates agents’ interactions while enforcing institutional rules.
- Communication layer – it provides a reliable and orderly transport service.

External agents intending to communicate with other external agents need to redirect their messages through the social layer, which is in charge of forwarding the messages (attempts of communication) to the communication layer. In specified conditions, erroneous or illicit messages (those that do not comply with the rules of the institution) may be rejected by the social layer in order to prevent them from arriving at their addressees. The social layer presented in (Esteva et al., 2004) is a multi-agent system itself and the agents belonging to it are called internal agents. We propose to extend AMELI: (i) by adding a new type of agent to the social layer, the so-called normative managers (represented as circles labelled NM1, ..., NMg in Fig. 3); and (ii) by adding protocols to coordinate this new type of agent with the rest of internal agents to manage normative transitions and resolve

[8] It may be the case that further correcting actions should be performed.
conflicts. We call AMELI+ the resulting architecture. Thus, in AMELI+, internal (administrative) agents are of the following types:

- **Governor (C)** – This is an internal agent representing an external agent. It maintains the external agent’s social state and informs the external agent about its normative positions. Very importantly, the governor agent acts as an intermediary for message exchanges among external agents, deciding on whether an external agent’s attempt at sending a message to another external agent is norm-compliant and, if so, forwarding this message to the appropriate external agent (who will receive the message via its governor agent). We require one governor agent per external agent.

- **Scene Manager (SM)** – This is an internal agent maintaining the state of the activity\(^9\), notifying any changes to normative managers and resolving conflicts.

- **Normative Manager (NM)** – This new type of internal agent receives normative commands and may fire one or more normative transitions.

In principle, only one NM is needed to manage all the normative transitions. However, in order to build large MAS and avoid bottlenecks, we propose the distribution of normative transitions into several NMs. The choice of the granularity of the normative layer, i.e. to choose from one single NM to one NM per normative transition, is an important design decision left to MAS designers.

AMELI\(^+\) computationally realizes normative structures, as described in Section 2, making use of the conflict resolution algorithm in Section 4. On the one hand, NMs handle normative transitions by coordinating their activities with SMs, which manage their activities’ normative states. Therefore, the links connecting normative transitions to normative states map to coordinations between NMs and SMs. On the other hand, SMs are responsible for solving conflicts by running the conflict resolution algorithm in Section 4. The architecture scales up well, as the administrative agents can run in different machines, so we have, in principle, as many agents as we have hardware to run them on (and more hardware can be added at will). Moreover, an agent-based architecture provides additional benefits as the agents can be endowed with arbitrary functionalities, e.g., our normative managers are able to run the conflict detection checks and the conflict resolution algorithm, and our governor agents can be endowed with sophisticated forms of dialogue with external agents, the former warning the latter about the consequence of their non-norm-compliant behavior (as explored in (García-Camino et al., 2006)).

### 6. Related work

Within agent-mediated electronic commerce (He, Jennings, & Leung, 2003; Sierra, 2004), various challenges arise when building open (that is, components come and go during the system’s execution), heterogeneous (that is, individual components have been implemented by different parties, using disparate architectures and assorted programming languages and technologies), and distributed (that is, the components run in various machines, geographically distant, communicating via message-passing) systems that will carry out sophisticated many-party interactions to provide goods and/or services.

Norms offer a useful and powerful abstraction with which to specify and regulate such systems, excluding disruptive or antisocial behavior without prescribing the design of individual agents or restricting their autonomy (Dignum, 1999; Vasconcelos et al., 2009). Norms provide a generic account of individual behaviors; if all agents have norm-regulated behaviors, then we can offer guarantees about the system as a whole. Similarly, norms provide a declarative statement of how agents are expected to behave, and so offer agents a way to predict the behavior of others in response to requests, the provision of information, etc. There is a wealth of socio-philosophical and logic-theoretical literature on the subject of norms (e.g., Sergot, 2001; Shoahm & Tennenholtz, 1995; von Wright, 1963), and, more recently, much attention is being paid to more pragmatic and implementation-oriented aspects of norms, that is, how norms can be given a computational interpretation and how norms can be taken into account in the design and execution of MASs (e.g., Artikis, Kamara, Pitt, & Sergot, 2005; Cranefield, 2005; Viganò, Fornara, & Colombetti, 2006; García-Camino et al., 2006).

However, to the best of our knowledge, very few authors have provided implementations managing and reasoning about normative positions in a distributed manner. In (Esteva et al., 2004; Minsky, 2005), two languages are presented for the distributed enforcement of normative positions in MASs. In (Esteva et al., 2004) an obligation is a first-order formula whose intuitive meaning is that if grounded utterances matching the given utterance schema are uttered in an activity, and given conditional expressions are satisfied, then, further grounded utterances matching the given utterance schema satisfying the given conditional expressions must be uttered in the corresponding activity.

In (Minsky, 2005; Minsky & Ungureanu, 2000) the authors propose law-governed interaction (LGI), a decentralized coordination and control mechanism for distributed systems. This middleware allows a possible large, heterogeneous and open set of actors to interact governed by a given policy, called the interaction law. In order to enforce the interaction law, a component called controller is associated to each actor. The controller is entrusted to mediate the interaction of its actor with others, it decides, by interpreting the active law, how to react to messages sent and received by its actor.

However, in both approaches (Esteva et al., 2004; Minsky, 2005), each agent has a local message interface that forwards legal messages according to a set of norms. Since these interfaces are local to each agent, norms can only be expressed in terms of actions of that agent. This is a serious disadvantage, e.g., when one needs to activate an obligation to one agent due to a certain message of another one.

The work presented in (Hübner, Boissier, Kitio, & Ricci, 2009) proposes Organizational Artifacts for multi-agent systems (ORA4-MAS). This approach may be seen as a distributed generalization of tuple-spaces but using objects and providing further functionalities. Its authors argue that instead of providing a “dialogical environment” as in the architecture presented in this paper...
The contributions we have presented open many possibilities for future work. We are currently working on a generalization of normative structures to make them operational with different coordination models, with richer deontic content and on top of different computational realizations of regulated MASs. As a first step in this direction we are taking advantage of the decoupling between interaction protocols and declarative normative guidance that the normative structure makes available, to provide a normative layer for electronic institutions (as defined in Arcos et al., 2005). We expect such combination will endow electronic institutions with a more flexible and expressive normative environment.

Furthermore, we want to extend our model along several directions. We would like to handle negation and arbitrary constraints (similarly to García-Camino, 2009) as part of the norm language, and in particular temporal aspects such as deadlines for normative positions and their extensions. We also want to accommodate multiple, hierarchical norm authorities based on roles, along the lines of (Cholvý & Cuppens, 1995) and power relationships as suggested in (Carabelea, Boissier, & Castelfranchi, 2004). Finally, we want to capture in the conflict resolution algorithm different semantics relating the deontic notions by supporting different axiomatizations (e.g., relative strength of prohibition versus obligation, default deontic notions, deontic inconsistencies).

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