Publicaciones

Of Social Norms and Sanctioning: A Game Theoretical Overview

Tipo de Publicación:

Journal Article

Origen:

International Journal of Agent Technologies and Systems (IJATS), IGI Global, Volumen2, Ejemplar1, p.15 (2010)

Resumen:

Social norms is a term that has been widely used in different areas of research
like sociology, philosophy or multiagent systems. However there is still not a
clear definition of what social norms are and the types of problems that they solve.
This work presents a general classification and distinction of norms. The type of norms
treated in this work are those norms created through the interaction of agents and
that are not imposed by any central authority. We identify different types of norms
and definitions, from a game theoretical point of view. The main differentiation is made
between convetional norms and essential norms: the former ones are norms created to
establish a convention in a situation where several solutions are equally feasible, but
it is needed for the society to decide one, e.g., driving on one side of the road; the
later norms solve problems of collective action. Finally, we analyze several aspects of
sanctioning mechanisms and how these mechanisms affect in the emergence of norms.

Proyectos: