We present Cooperative Boolean Games, a natural
family of coalitional games that are both compact and
expressive. In such a game, an agent’s primary aim is to
achieve its individual goal, which is represented as a
propositional logic formula over some set of Boolean
variables. Each agent is assumed to exercise unique control
over some subset of the overall set of Boolean variables,
and the set of valuations for these variables corresponds
to the set of actions the agent can take. However, the
actions available to an agent are assumed to have some cost,
and an agent’s secondary aim is to minimise its costs. Typically,
an agent must cooperate with others because it does not
have sufficient control to ensure its goal is satisfied. However,
the desire to minimise costs leads to preferences over possible
coalitions, and hence to strategic behaviour. We discuss
solution concepts of the core and stable sets for them. In each
case, we characterise the complexity of the associated solution
concept, and discuss the surrounding issues. Finally, we
present a bargaining protocol for cooperation in Boolean
games, and characterise the strategies in equilibrium for
this protocol.