On Grievance Protocols for Conflict Resolution in Open Multi-Agent Systems
Publication Type:
Conference PaperSource:
44th Hawaii International International Conference on Systems Science (HICSS-44 2011), IEEE Computer Society, Hawaii, p.1-10 (2011)ISBN:
978-0-7695-4282-9Abstract:
This paper presents the specification of an agentbased framework for conflict resolution into Open Multi-agent Systems by means of grievance protocols. In this framework, any grievance process primarily involves negotiation (with or without mediation) and arbitration or a combination of both. In this way, the result of a conflict resolution can be an agreement among the conflicting parties by which they voluntary settle the conflict, or a decision from the arbitrator (a neutral third party) which is final, and binding on both conflicting parties. The framework is designed in such a way that multiple agreement mechanisms may be available at any given time, to be activated and adjusted on demand (on-line) by participating agents. The framework is also generic enough so that new protocols may be easily added. The objective is to have a generic electronic institution that may be tailored to specific needs and grafted into other electronic institutions.
Of Social Norms and Sanctioning: A Game Theoretical Overview
Publication Type:
Journal ArticleSource:
International Journal of Agent Technologies and Systems (IJATS), IGI Global, Volume 2, Issue 1, p.15 (2010)Abstract:
Social norms is a term that has been widely used in different areas of research
like sociology, philosophy or multiagent systems. However there is still not a
clear definition of what social norms are and the types of problems that they solve.
This work presents a general classification and distinction of norms. The type of norms
treated in this work are those norms created through the interaction of agents and
that are not imposed by any central authority. We identify different types of norms
and definitions, from a game theoretical point of view. The main differentiation is made
between convetional norms and essential norms: the former ones are norms created to
establish a convention in a situation where several solutions are equally feasible, but
it is needed for the society to decide one, e.g., driving on one side of the road; the
later norms solve problems of collective action. Finally, we analyze several aspects of
sanctioning mechanisms and how these mechanisms affect in the emergence of norms.
Norm internalization in artificial societies
Publication Type:
Journal ArticleSource:
AI Communications, IOS Press, Volume 23, p.15 (2010)Abstract:
Internalization is at study in social-behavioural sciences and moral philosophy since long; of late, the debate was
revamped within the rationality approach to the study of cooperation and compliance since internalization is a less costly and more
reliable enforcement system than social control. But how does it work? So far, poor attention was paid to themental underpinnings
of internalization. This paper advocates a rich cognitive model of different types, degrees and factors of internalization. In order
to check the individual and social effect of internalization, we have adapted an existing agent architecture, EMIL-A, providing
it with internalization capabilities, turning it into EMIL-I-A. Experiments have proven satisfactory results with respect to the
maintenance of cooperation in a proof-of-concept simulation.
Managing Water Demand as a Regulated Open MAS
Publication Type:
Conference PaperSource:
MALLOW Workshop on Coordination, Organization, Institutions and Norms in Agent Systems in On-Line Communities (COIN@MALLOW’09), CEUR-WS.org, Volume 494, Turin, p.108-109 (2009)URL:
http://sunsite.informatik.rwth-aachen.de/Publications/CEUR-WS/Vol-494/coinpaper6.pdfAbstract:
The management of natural resources is a complex tasks of significant social relevance. In particular, water management, because of growing scarcity and considerable economic and social implications, is at the forefront of public policy priorities in many countries. At the core of water policy is the need to foster a more rational use of the resource and this may be addressed by creating an efficient market of water rights. However the design and operation of such a market is not an easy endeavor because it needs to coexist in a complex social and legal framework that has evolved to address the different and sometimes conflicting objectives of the many stake holders involved.
This paper describes mWater, a regulated multiagent system where autonomous agents trade rights for the use of water in a closed basin. The focus of the paper is on the institutional framework that regulates those interactions and a discussion of the research opportunities therein.
A Simulator for Organisation-Centred MAS Adaptation in P2P Sharing Networks
Publication Type:
Conference PaperSource:
9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2010), IFAAMAS, Toronto, Canada, p.1615-1616 (2010)Abstract:
We present a simulator to compare different approaches to organisation-centred MAS adaptation in a peer-to-peer (P2P) scenario. In particular, we describe our approach to MAS adaptation (2-LAMA), the P2P sharing network case study and the software we built to evaluate different alternatives.
