norms

Regulated MAS: Social Perspective

Book Chapter

Source:

Normative Multi-Agent Systems, Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, Number 4, p.93--133 (2013)

ISBN:

978-3-939897-51-4

URL:

http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2013/4001

Keywords:

NormMAS; Norms; Open Interaction

Abstract:

This chapter addresses the problem of building normative multiagent systems in terms of regulatory mechanisms. It describes a static conceptual model through which one can specify normative multiagent systems along with a dynamic model to capture their operation and evolution. The chapter proposes a typology of applications and presents some open problems. In the last section, the authors express their individual views on these matters.

The Uses of Norms

Book Chapter

Source:

Normative Multi-Agent Systems, Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, Number 4, p.191-229 (2013)

ISBN:

978-3-939897-51-4

Keywords:

Norms; MAS; Governance; Requirements engineering

Abstract:

This chapter presents a variety of applications of norms. These applications include governance in sociotechnical systems, data licensing and data collection, understanding software development teams, requirements engineering, assurance, natural resource allocation, wireless grids, autonomous vehicles, serious games, and virtual worlds.

Introduction to the special issue on NorMAS 2009

Journal Article

Source:

Journal of Logic and Computation, Oxford University Press , Volume 23, Issue 2, p.307-308 (2013)

Keywords:

Norms; nomrative MAS

Abstract:

In March 2009, the fourth NorMAS (Normative Multi-agent Systems) was held at Schloss Dagstuhl Leibniz Center for Informatics. During the seminar, around 30 invited participants presented their current research, and discussed ongoing work and open problems discussed. This special issue presents a few of the papers discussing formals models (both logic and computational implementations) and normative concepts of relevance to the area.

The Dutch eat at 5: 30 pm: shared strategies for agent reasoning

Conference Paper

Source:

Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2012), International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Volume 3, Valencia, Spain, p.1421-1422 (2012)

Keywords:

shared strategies; norms; multi-agent systems

Abstract:

In the Netherlands, almost all people have dinner around 5:30pm. As a foreigner in that country, it is almost impossible to plan a (working) meeting around this time, which would be a normal' time in many other countries. On the other hand, having dinner that early is not an obligation. No one will be o fended or would even care if you choose to eat later. This is an example of a shared strategy, i.e. an institutional arrangement where diff erent actors have the intention of performing the same task at a certain time or setting. InMAS research, shared strategies can be a new way of expressing conventions that cannot easily be fitted into norms, individual plans or collective intentions, while sharing some elements with all of these.

Normative Multi-Agent Systems (Dagstuhl Seminar 12111)

Journal Article

Source:

Dagstuhl Reports, Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, Volume 2, Issue 3, p.23-49 (2012)

URL:

http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2012/3535

Keywords:

Normative Multiagent systems; Autonomous agents and Multiagent systems; Agreement Technologies; Norms

Abstract:

This report documents the program and the outcomes of Dagstuhl Seminar 12111 `Normative Multi-Agent Systems''. Normative systems are systems in the behavior of which norms play a role and which need normative concepts in order to be described or specified. A normative multi-agent system combines models for normative systems (dealing for example with obligations, permissions and prohibitions) with models for multi-agent systems. Norms have been proposed in multi-agent systems and computer science to deal with issues of coordination, security, electronic commerce and institutions, agent organization. However, due to the lack of a unified theory, many multi-agent system researchers are presently developing their own ad hoc concepts and applications. The aim of this Dagstuhl Seminar was to formulate a collective appraisal of the current perspectives in the field and the most promising venues for future activity. In particular, the seminar has been conceived for the writing of a volume titled "A Prospective view of Normative Multi Agent Systems" aimed to become a standard reference in the field and to provide guidelines for future research in normative multi-agent systems.

A Distributed Architecture for Enforcing Norms in Open MAS

Book Chapter

Source:

Advanced Agent Technology, Springer, Volume 7068, Berlin / Heidelberg, p.457-471 (2012)

ISBN:

978-3-642-27215-8

Abstract:

Norms have been promoted as a coordination mechanism for controlling agent behaviours in open MAS. Thus, agent platforms must provide normative support, allowing both norm-aware and non norm-aware agents to take part in MAS controlled by norms. In this paper, the most relevant proposals on the definition of norm enforcement mechanisms have been analysed. These proposals present several drawbacks that make them unsuitable for open MAS. In response to these problems, this paper describes a new Norm-Enforcing Architecture aimed at controlling open MAS.

Beyond the Carrot and Stick Approach to Enforcement: An Agent-Based Model

Conference Paper

Source:

European Conference on Cognitive Science, New Bulgarian University Press, Sofia (2011)

ISBN:

978-954-535-660-5

Keywords:

Norms; Punishment; Self-organization;

Abstract:

As specified by Axelrod in his seminal work An Evolutionary
Approach to Norms (Axelrod, 1986), punishment is a key
mechanism to achieve the necessary social control and to enforce
social norms in a self-regulated society. In this paper,
we distinguish between two enforcing mechanisms, punishment
and sanction, focusing on the specific ways in which they
favour the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. In particular,
by punishment we refer to a practice that works only
by imposing a cost, while by sanction we indicate a practice
that also signals the existence of a norm and that its violation
is not condoned. To achieve this, we have developed a normative
agent able both to punish and sanction offenders and to
be affected by these enforcing mechanisms itself.The results
obtained through agent-based simulation show that sanction is
more effective and makes the population more resilient to sudden
changes than mere punishment.

Dynamic Sanctioning for Robust and Cost-Efficient Norm Compliance

Conference Paper

Source:

Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Arti?cial Intelligence, IJCAI/AAAI, Barcelona, p.414-419 (2011)

ISBN:

978-1-57735-516-8

Abstract:

As explained by Axelrod in his seminal work An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, punishment is a key mechanism to achieve the necessary social control and to impose social norms in a self-regulated society. In this paper, we distinguish between two enforcing mechanisms. i.e. punishment and sanction, focusing on the specific ways in which they favor the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. The key research question is to find more stable and cheaper mechanisms for norm compliance in hybrid social environments (populated by humans and computational agents). To achieve this task, we have developed a normative agent able to punish and sanction defectors and to dynamically choose the right amount of punishment and sanction to impose on them (Dynamic Adaptation Heuristic). The results obtained through agent-based simulation show us that sanction is more effective and less costly than punishment in the achievement and maintenance of cooperation and it makes the population more resilient to sudden changes than if it were enforced only by mere punishment.

Social Instruments for Convention Emergence

Conference Paper

Source:

10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2011), Volume 3, Taipei. Taiwan, p.1161-1162 (2011)

ISBN:

978-0-9826571-5-7

Abstract:

In this paper we present the notion of Social Instruments as a set
of mechanisms that facilitate the emergence of norms from repeated
interactions between members of a society. Specifically, we focus on
two social instruments: rewiring and observation. Our main goal is
to provide agents with tools that allow them to leverage their
social network of interactions when effectively addressing
coordination and learning problems, paying special attention to
dissolving meta\-stable subconventions. Finally, we present a more
sophisticated social instrument (observation + rewiring)
for robust resolution of \emph{subconventions}, which works dissolving Self-Reinforcing Substructures (SRS) in the social
network.

Towards a Normative BDI Architecture for Norm Compliance.

Conference Paper

Source:

11th International Workshop on Coordination, Organization, Institutions and Norms in Multi-Agent Systems (COIN@MALLOW2010), Lyon, France, p.65-81 (2010)

Abstract:

Multi-AgentSystems require coordination mechanisms in order to assemble the behaviour of autonomous and heterogeneous agents and achieve the desired performance of the whole system. Norms are deontic statements employed by these coordination mechanisms which define constraints to the potential excesses of agents’ autonomous behaviour. However, norms are only effective if agents are capable of understanding and managing them pragmatically. In this paper, we propose an extension of the BDI proposal in order to allow agents to take pragmatic autonomous decisions considering the existence of norms. In particular, coherence and consistency theory will be employed as a criterion for determining norm compliance.