MaNEA: A distributed architecture for enforcing norms in open MAS
Publication Type:
Journal ArticleSource:
Engineering applications of artificial intelligence, Elsevier, Volume 26, p.76-95 (2013)Keywords:
normative agents; norm enforcement; openMAS; agent platformsAbstract:
Norms have been promoted as a coordination mechanism for controlling agent behaviours in open MAS. Thus, agent platforms must provide normative support, allowing both norm-aware and non norm-aware agents to take part in MAS that are controlled by norms. In this paper, the most relevant proposals on the de nition of norm enforcement mechanisms are analysed. These proposals present several drawbacks that make them unsuitable for open MAS. In response to these problems, this paper describes a new Norm-Enforcing Architecture aimed at controlling norms in open MAS. Speci cally, this architecture supports the creation and deletion of norms on-line as well as the dynamic activation and expiration of instances. Finally, it can dynamically adapt to di erent scale MAS. The eciency of this architecture has been experimentally evaluated and the results are shown in this article.
Norms in H-F-G societies. Grounds for agent-based social simulation.
Publication Type:
Conference PaperSource:
CAA'2010 Fusion of Cultures. Proceedings of the 38th Conference on Computer Applications and Quantitative Methods in Archaeology, CAA, Granada, p.237-240 (2010)Abstract:
The use of agent-directed simulation in archaeology has a relatively long tradition. However, these simulations have been always oriented mainly to study spatial processes and resource management and systematically ignore an es- sential aspect of any society: the use of social and institutional norms as a mechanism to regulate the behaviour of the individuals. In this paper we propose a norm-centric simulation (in contrast to the traditional resource-centric simulation) where the normative system is both the core of the simulation and the subject of study. Our final goal is to set the foundations of a rather general model of social behaviour in a hunter-fisher-gatherer (HFG) society without political institutions but with strict social norms.
Notes:
There is a Spanish version in Cuadernos de Prehistoria y Arqueología, No. 20; pp 149-161., 2010 (U. Granada)
A Distributed Architecture for Enforcing Norms in Open MAS
Publication Type:
Book ChapterSource:
Advanced Agent Technology, Springer, Volume 7068, Berlin / Heidelberg, p.457-471 (2012)ISBN:
978-3-642-27215-8URL:
http://www.springerlink.com/content/f45r56u48418r432/Abstract:
Norms have been promoted as a coordination mechanism for controlling agent behaviours in open MAS. Thus, agent platforms must provide normative support, allowing both norm-aware and non norm-aware agents to take part in MAS controlled by norms. In this paper, the most relevant proposals on the definition of norm enforcement mechanisms have been analysed. These proposals present several drawbacks that make them unsuitable for open MAS. In response to these problems, this paper describes a new Norm-Enforcing Architecture aimed at controlling open MAS.
Norm enforceability in Electronic Institutions?
Publication Type:
Book ChapterSource:
Coordination, Organization, Institutions and Norms in agent systems VI, Springer, Number 6541, p.250-257 (2011)Keywords:
electronic institutions; normative systems; normative agentsAbstract:
Nowadays Multi-Agent Systems require more and more regulation and normative mechanisms in order to assure the correct and secure execution of the interactions and transactions in the open virtual organization they are implementing. The Electronic Institution approach for developing Multi-Agent Systems implements some enforceability mechanisms in order to control norms execution and observance.
In this paper we study a complex situation in a regulated environment in which the enforceability mechanisms provided by the current Electronic Institutions implementation cannot deal appropriately with norm observance. The analyzed situation is exempli ed with a speci c scenario of the mWater regulated environment, an electronic market for water-rights transfer. After this example is presented, we extrapolate it to a more generic domain while also addressing the main issues for its application in general scenarios.
Beyond the Carrot and Stick Approach to Enforcement: An Agent-Based Model
Publication Type:
Conference PaperSource:
European Conference on Cognitive Science, New Bulgarian University Press, Sofia (2011)ISBN:
978-954-535-660-5Keywords:
Norms; Punishment; Self-organization;Abstract:
As specified by Axelrod in his seminal work An Evolutionary
Approach to Norms (Axelrod, 1986), punishment is a key
mechanism to achieve the necessary social control and to enforce
social norms in a self-regulated society. In this paper,
we distinguish between two enforcing mechanisms, punishment
and sanction, focusing on the specific ways in which they
favour the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. In particular,
by punishment we refer to a practice that works only
by imposing a cost, while by sanction we indicate a practice
that also signals the existence of a norm and that its violation
is not condoned. To achieve this, we have developed a normative
agent able both to punish and sanction offenders and to
be affected by these enforcing mechanisms itself.The results
obtained through agent-based simulation show that sanction is
more effective and makes the population more resilient to sudden
changes than mere punishment.
Dynamic Sanctioning for Robust and Cost-Efficient Norm Compliance
Publication Type:
Conference PaperSource:
Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Arti?cial Intelligence, IJCAI/AAAI, Barcelona, p.414-419 (2011)ISBN:
978-1-57735-516-8Abstract:
As explained by Axelrod in his seminal work An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, punishment is a key mechanism to achieve the necessary social control and to impose social norms in a self-regulated society. In this paper, we distinguish between two enforcing mechanisms. i.e. punishment and sanction, focusing on the specific ways in which they favor the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. The key research question is to find more stable and cheaper mechanisms for norm compliance in hybrid social environments (populated by humans and computational agents). To achieve this task, we have developed a normative agent able to punish and sanction defectors and to dynamically choose the right amount of punishment and sanction to impose on them (Dynamic Adaptation Heuristic). The results obtained through agent-based simulation show us that sanction is more effective and less costly than punishment in the achievement and maintenance of cooperation and it makes the population more resilient to sudden changes than if it were enforced only by mere punishment.
An Electronic Institution for Simulating Water-Right Markets
Publication Type:
Conference PaperSource:
III Workshop on Agreement Technologies at IBERAMIA 2010 (WAT 2010), Bahía Blanca, Argentina, p.3-18 (2010)Abstract:
In countries like Spain, and particularly in its Mediterranean coast, there is a high degree of public awareness of the main consequences of the scarcity of water and the need of fostering efficient use of water resources. Two new mechanisms for water management already under way are: a heated debate on the need and feasibility of transferring water from one basin to another, and, directly related to this proposal, the regulation of water banks1. This paper is about mWater, an agent-based electronic market of water rights. Our focus is on demand and, in particular, on the type of regulatory and market mechanisms that foster an efficient use of water while preventing conflicts. In this work we present the regulated environment which is implemented as an Electronic Institution for simulating water-right markets in order to evaluate the impacts of different regulations on the market behavior
09121 Abstracts Collection -- Normative Multi-Agent Systems
Publication Type:
Conference PaperSource:
Normative Multi-Agent Systems, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, Germany, Volume 09121, Dagstuhl, Germany, p.1-17 (2009)URL:
http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1922Abstract:
From 15.03. to 20.03.2009, the Dagstuhl Seminar 09121 "Normative Multi-Agent Systems'' was held in Schloss Dagstuhl, Leibniz Center for Informatics. This paper contains the abstracts of
the presentations given during the seminar.
Normative Multi-Agent Systems
Publication Type:
Conference ProceedingsSource:
Normative Multi-Agent Systems, LZI (Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik), Volume 09121, Dagstuhl, Germany (2009)URL:
http://drops.dagstuhl.de/volltexte/09121-Proceedings.pdfAbstract:
From15.03. to 20.03.2009, the Dagstuhl Seminar0912 "Normative Multi-Agent Systems" was held in Schloss Dagstuhl. Leibniz Center for Informatics. During the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. This volume contains the 26 papers presented and a short introduction by the editors.
A multiagent network for peer norm enforcement
Publication Type:
Journal ArticleSource:
Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems, Volume 21, p.397-424 (2010)Keywords:
Multiagent systems; norms; enforcement; social network; ostracismAbstract:
In a multiagent system where norms are used to regulate the actions agents ought to execute, some agents may decide not to abide by the norms if this can benefit them. Norm enforcement mechanisms are designed to counteract these benefits and thus the motives for not abiding by the norms. In this work we propose a distributed mechanism through which agents in the multiagent system that do not abide by the norms can be ostracised by their peers. An ostracised agent cannot interact anymore and looses all benefits from future interactions. We describe a model for multiagent systems structured as networks of agents, and a behavioural model for the agents in such systems. Furthermore, we provide analytical results which show that there exists an upper bound to the number of potential norm violations when all the agents exhibit certain behaviours. We also provide experimental results showing that both stricter enforcement behaviours and larger percentage of agents exhibiting these behaviours reduce the number of norm violations, and that the network topology influences the number of norm violations. These experiments have been executed under varying scenarios with different values for the number of agents, percentage of enforcers, percentage of violators, network topology, and agent behaviours. Finally, we give examples of applications where the enforcement techniques we provide could be used.
