We address the problem of deciding resource allocation policies in open embedded systems,
whereby the system components have to form an opportunistic alliance and collectively
agree a policy that is congruent with the state of the environment in which the system is
embedded. This problem arises in a number of systems and applications, including sensor
networks, cloud computing, and infrastructure management for water, energy, and transport.
We begin be presenting a methodology for the formal characterisation and operationalisation
of social science theories in a computationally tractable framework. We apply the methodology
to Ostrom's socio-economic principles for self-governing institutions, demonstrating how the institutional
rules can be represented in a framework for specifying dynamic norm-governed systems. We then show how
six out of eight of Ostrom's principles can be given a formal characterisation through an axiomatisation
in the Event Calculus, an action language from artificial intelligence used for representing and
reasoning about agency, action and change. Finally we examine three propositions: that open,
embedded and resource-constrained systems can be considered from the perspective of institutions
for management of common pool resources (CPR); secondly, that socio-economic principles for
enduring institutions can formally characterised and operationalised as norm-governed systems; and
thirdly that such an axiomatisation can be used as a basis for systematic experiments to test whether
rhese principles are necessary and sufficient conditions for enduring electronic institutions.